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STATE V. VANDENBERG: LOWERING THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT BAR WHILE AVOIDING THE ISSUE OF
PRETEXTUAL POLICE CONDUCT
TODD COBERLY*
I. INTRODUCTION
In State v. Vandenberg,' the New Mexico Supreme Court "trace[d] the outer
boundary of facts and circumstances sufficient to justify a protective frisk... for
weapons during an ordinary traffic stop on the ground of officer safety pursuant to
the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution."2 If only it were so
simple. But in an opinion dealing with an anything-but-ordinary traffic stop, the
court traced too much-and too little. This Note faults Vandenberg on three
grounds. First, in its attempt at defining the "outer boundary" of facts justifying a
protective frisk, the supreme court cast its net too wide.3 Second, the ruling
effectively enables police officers to pull New Mexican motorists over for purely
arbitrary reasons.4 Finally, the court skirted the issue of pretextual police conduct
and, by doing so, missed an opportunity to clarify the scope of article II, section 10
of the New Mexico State Constitution in this context. 5
II. STATE V. VANDENBERG: FACTS AND HISTORY
A. The FirstStop
At around 5:00 p.m. on July 29, 1999,6 Jason Swanson, a young man with long
hair,7 was driving a 1975 Monte Carlo north on U.S. Highway 54 just south of
Alamogordo, New Mexico.' Riding along with him in the front seat was Shawn
Vandenberg. 9 As Otero County Deputy Sheriff Benny House, driving in the
opposite direction, passed the Monte Carlo, he briefly observed the car and thought
that its license plate was missing.'" After making a U-turn, Deputy House pulled the
car over;" however, once he did so, Deputy House realized that the car had a
license plate and that it was properly displayed "in a place where the manufacturer
had designed it to be."' 12 Nevertheless, Deputy House requested Swanson's driver's
3
license, registration, and proof of insurance' -all of which came back clear. 14

*
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
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Class of 2006, University of New Mexico School of Law.
2003-NMSC-030, 81 P.3d 19.
Id.l1, 81P.3d at 21.
See infra Part V.A.2.
See infra Part V.A. 1.
See infra Part V.B.
Vandenberg, 2003-NMSC-030,1 3, 81 P.3d at 22.
Defendant-Respondent's Answer Brief at 2, State v. Vandenberg, 2003-NMSC-030, 81 P.3d 19 (No.
Vandenberg, 2003-NMSC-030,13, 81 P.3d at 22 ("Highway 54 is an area ofheavy drug trafficking.").
State v. Vandenberg, 2002-NMCA-066, 2, 48 P.3d 92, 94.
Id.
Id.

12. Vandenberg, 2003-NMSC-030, 13, 81 P.3d at 22.
13. Id.
14. Vandenberg, 2002-NMCA-066, 1 2, 48 P.3d at 94.
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Deputy House also asked Swanson where he and Vandenberg had been and
where they were going. 5 The two responded that they had just dropped off a friend
at the El Paso, Texas, airport and were headed home.'6 At some point, another car
"drove by and [its occupants] 'honked and hollered."" 7 Without inquiring, Deputy
House assumed the car had traveled with the Monte Carlo to the airport.'8 Deputy
House thought it odd that two cars had gone to the airport and determined that the
story was "inconsistent."' 9
After Deputy House told Swanson and Vandenberg that they were free to go,
another officer with a narcotics K-9 pulled up.20 Before the two could leave, Deputy
House asked Swanson if he would consent to a dog sniff around the exterior of the
car.2' "According to Deputy House, Swanson and Vandenberg.. .looked at each
other, refused to make eye contact with Deputy House, and became very nervous
when asked about the canine sniff."22 After asking if he had to consent and being
informed by Deputy House that he did not, Swanson said that he was in a rush and
refused the sniff.23
Because of the nervous behavior exhibited by Swanson and Vandenberg while
refusing the dog sniff, combined with the "inconsistent" story the two had given,
Deputy House's "suspicions were aroused."24 Hence, Deputy House initiated a "beon-the-lookout (BOLO) to the Alamogordo City Police"25 as a "courtesy."26
Responding to the BOLO, Officer Roberts was told by Deputy House that Swanson
and Vandenberg "had seemed nervous, had given an inconsistent story, and had
refused to allow a narcotics dog to walk around their car."27
B. The Second Stop
Within a few minutes, Officer Roberts, with a narcotics dog of his own, pulled
Swanson over after clocking the Monte Carlo going thirty-five miles-per-hour in a
twenty-five miles-per-hour construction zone.28 Officer Roberts picked the Monte
Carlo out of the middle of a stream of cars that were essentially traveling the same
speed. 29 According to Officer Roberts, "[t]he license plate was clearly visible [and
he] could see that the plate displayed a current license plate renewal sticker,"3 even

15. Id. 13, 48 P.3d at 94.
16. Vandenberg, 2003-NMSC-030, 5,81 P.3d at 22. U.S. Highway 54 links Alamogordo, New Mexico,
and El Paso, Texas, so the response by itself should not have been suspicious.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. 4, 81 P.3d at 22.
23. Vandenberg, 2002-NMCA-066, 4, 48 P.3d at 94.
24. Vandenberg, 2003-NMSC-030, 5, 81 P.3d at 22.
25. Id. 16, 81 P.3dat22.
26. Vandenberg, 2002-NMCA-066, 1 6, 48 P.3d at 94 (internal quotation marks omitted).
27. Id.
28. Id. l 7-8, 48 P.3d at 94-95.
29. See Defendant-Respondent's Answer Brief at 5 & n.3, State v. Vandenberg, 2003-NMSC-030, 81 P.3d
19 (No. 27,509).
30. Vandenberg, 2002-NMCA-066, 7, 48 P.3d at 94.
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as he was driving down the road.3 At some point after Officer Roberts had returned
to his vehicle with Swanson's documents, Officer Yost arrived on the scene.3 2
While writing out a warning citation,3 3 Officer Roberts observed the following: (1)
Swanson tapping his fingers on the hood of the car, (2) Swanson and Vandenberg
glancing back at Officer Roberts in the car's mirrors and over their shoulders, (3)
Vandenberg rolling a window up and down several times, and (4) conversation
between the two occupants.3" Because "most people involved in a routine traffic
stop" do not exhibit these nervous tics, and in light of the information
in the BOLO
35
report, Officer Roberts "became nervous about his safety.,
C. The Frisk
Upon returning to the Monte Carlo to issue the warning, Officer Roberts asked
Swanson and Vandenberg if they had any weapons in the car.36 When they
responded in the negative, Officer Roberts ordered them from the Monte Carlo in
order to conduct a frisk.37 When Officer Roberts ordered Swanson to the rear of the
car, Swanson backed away, questioning the validity of the frisk.38 Officer Roberts
responded that it was "simply a pat down for weapons" and put his hand on
Swanson's shoulder to lead him to the back of the car.39 Swanson again pulled away
but submitted to the frisk after Officer Roberts ordered him to put his hands behind
his head.' The frisk of Swanson yielded a package of marijuana stuck in his
waistband."' Vandenberg then volunteered that he too had marijuana stuck in his
pants."2 A further search of the car failed to yield any more drugs or any weapons."3

31. Vandenberg, 2003-NMSC-030, 76, 81 P.3d at 38 (Chavez, J., dissenting).
32. There was a discrepancy as to whether Officer Yost came to Officer Roberts' assistance on her own
volition after hearing the BOLO or as a response to Officer Roberts' call for backup. Id. 9 n. 1, 81 P.3d at 23 n. 1
(majority opinion). At the earlier grand jury proceeding, Officer Roberts testified that Officer Yost came to assist
on her own after she saw that Officer Roberts had pulled the Monte Carlo over. Later, at the suppression hearing,
Officer Roberts claimed that Officer Yost responded to his call for backup because he got nervous during the stop.
Id. Although Officer Yost "admitted that she was looking for a reason to stop" the Monte Carlo, id. 72, 81 P.3d
at 37 (Chavez, J., dissenting), she claimed that she could not remember how it came to pass that she arrived at the
scene. Id. 9 n.1, 81 P.3d at 23 n.1 (majority opinion); see Vandenberg, 2002-NMCA-066,1 8 n. 1, 48 P.3d at 95
n.1.

Interestingly, the court of appeals and the supreme court credited different versions. Compare
Vandenberg, 2002-NMCA-066, 8, 48 P.3d at 95 (believing Officer Roberts' earlier grand jury testimony that
Yost arrived on her own), with Vandenberg, 2003-NMSC-030, 9, 81 P.3d at 23 (believing Officer Roberts' later
testimony that Yost responded after he radioed her out of his concern for safety).
33. Vandenberg, 2002-NMCA-066, 10,48 P.3d at 95.
34. Vandenberg, 2003-NMSC-030,
8-9,81 P.3d at 22-23. An explanation for the rolling up and down
ofthe window is found in the court of appeals opinion. See Vandenberg, 2002-NMCA-066, 9, 48 P.3d at 95 ("At
the time of the stop it was hot, humid, and raining off and on.").
35. Vandenberg, 2003-NMSC-030, 9, 81 P.3d at 23.
36. Id. 1 10,81 P.3d at 23.
37. Id.
38. Id. 1l,81 P.3dat23.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. 12, 81 P.3dat 23.
42. Id. N 11-13, 81 P.3d at 23.
43. Id. 13, 81 P.3d at 23. It should be noted that although the Fourth Amendment allows an officer to
search an automobile without a warrant after arresting an occupant, New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454,460 (1981),
New Mexico follows a stricter standard under art. II,§ 10 of its constitution. See State v. Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006,
144, 932 P.2d 1, 13 ("Quite simply, if there is no reasonablebasis for believing an automobile will be moved or
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D. ProceduralHistory
Vandenberg and Swanson filed a motion to suppress the marijuana.' Even
though the district court thought that the circumstances "look[ed] fishy," and that
Deputy House's testimony "seem[ed] odd," the district court denied the motion.4 5
The lower court was concerned "that to hold otherwise 'would leave officers in a
position46of subjecting themselves to unacceptable risks in the context of traffic
stops.'
In a split decision, the court of appeals reversed.47 Writing for the majority, Judge
Alarid held that Swanson's and Vandenberg's Fourth Amendment rights were
violated by the first traffic stop48 and by the frisk49 because, as a matter of law, the
objective facts available to the officers did not add up to reasonable suspicion. In
dissent, Judge Pickard noted that, had the case been about the investigation of a
crime, "individual rights [would] prevail under these facts" when applying current
New Mexico precedent.5" Since the issue was officer safety, however, Judge Pickard
would have deferred, as the trial court did, to Officer Roberts' articulation as to why
he feared for his safety.5
The New Mexico Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals. 2 Because Officer
Roberts was able to articulate why he feared for his safety, combined with the
nervous behavior Vandenberg and Swanson exhibited at both stops, the court held
the frisk reasonable. 3 Moreover, the majority held the first stop lawful because,
although mistaken, Deputy House honestly believed Swanson was violating a traffic
ordinance.5 4 Finally, believing there was nothing pretextual about Officer Roberts'
conduct, the court dismissed Vandenberg's article II, section 10 claim.55 Justice
Minzner dissented on her belief that the frisk was unreasonable.56 Justice Chavez
wrote a separate dissent in which57 he argued that the first stop by Deputy House
violated the Fourth Amendment.

its search will otherwise be compromised by delay, then a warrant is required."); State v. Arredondo, 1997-NMCA081, B 28-29,944 P.2d 276,284-85 (stating that Gomez applies to Belton), overruledon other groundsby State
v. Steinzig, 1999-NMCA-081, 944 P.2d 276. See generally infra Part II.B.
44. Vandenberg, 2003-NMSC-030, 14, 81 P.3d at 23.
45. Id. 1 14, 81 P.3d at 24 (internal quotation marks omitted).
46. Id. 15, 81 P.3d at 24 (quoting the district court).
47. Vandenberg, 2002-NMCA-066, 48 P.3d 92.
48. Id. 18,48 P.3d at 97 ("[T]he evidence elicited at the hearing.. .would not support a finding that Deputy
House's failure to notice the license plate was objectively reasonable.").
49. Id. 25,48 P.3d at 99 ("[Alt the point in time that Officer Roberts ordered [Vandenberg] and Swanson
out of their car, Officer Roberts lacked a reasonable suspicion that they were armed and prepared to use deadly
force....").
50. Id. 33, 48 P.3d at 101 (Pickard, J., dissenting) (discussing State v. Cardenas-Alvarez, 2001-NMSC017, 25 P.3d 225).
51. See id. I 33-34, 48 P.3d at 101.
52. Vandenberg, 2003-NMSC-030, 1, 81 P.3d at 21.
53. See id. 20-37, 81 P.3d at 25-29; infra notes 153-167 and accompanying text.
54. See Vandenberg, 2003-NMSC-030, fT 40-42, 81 P.3d at 29-30; see also infra Part IV.A.2.a.
55. Vandenberg, 2003-NMSC-030, 53, 81 P.3d at 33; see infra Part IV.A.3.
56. See Vandenberg,2003-NMSC-030,
57-68,81 P.3d at 33-36 (Minzner, J., dissenting); see also infra
Part IV.B.1.
57. See Vandenberg, 2003-NMSC-030, ft 74-81, 81 P.3d at 37-39 (Chavez, J., dissenting); see also infra
Part IV.B.2. Concurring with Justice Minzner, Justice Chavez also added points he thought relevant to the analysis
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III. BACKGROUND
Before discussing the rationale of the Vandenberg majority and dissents, this
Note gives an overview of relevant Fourth Amendment search and seizure
jurisprudence. 8 It then discusses how article II,section 10 of the New Mexico State
Constitution has been construed to offer New Mexicans broader protections than
those provided by the Fourth Amendment. 9
A. The FourthAmendment
The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution guarantees people the right to
be free from unreasonable searches and seizures." In conducting a Fourth
Amendment analysis, courts first determine whether any given search or seizure is
reasonable.6 If the police acted unreasonably, the next consideration is whether the
exclusionary rule62 should be used to suppress any evidence resulting from the
illegal action. 3
1. Reasonableness: The "Touchstone"
a. Generally
A search or seizure conducted without a warrant issued by a neutral magistrate
on probable cause' is presumptively unreasonable. 5 This per se unreasonableness
rule, however, is subject "to a few specifically established and well-delineated
exceptions." When an exception is implicated, a neutral magistrate may still be
called upon to conduct an after-the-fact review in the context of a suppression
hearing. Measuring the facts from an objective standard, reviewing courts gauge the
reasonableness of an officer's conduct by balancing the legitimate government

of Officer Roberts' frisk. See Vandenberg, 2003-NMSC-030, TI69-73, 81 P.3d at 36-37 (Chavez, J., dissenting).
58. See infra Part ll.A.
59. See infra Part IH.B.
60. The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
61. See, e.g., Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326,330 (2001) (stating that the Fourth Amendment's '"central
requirement' is one of reasonableness").
62. See infra Part IlI.A.2.
63. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984) ("Whether the exclusionary sanction is
appropriately imposed in a particular case.. .is 'an issue separate from the question whether the Fourth Amendment
rights of the party seeking to invoke the rule were violated by police conduct."' (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S.
213, 223 (1983))).
64. Probable cause is defined as, "A reasonable ground to suspect that a person has committed or is
committing a crime or that a place contains specific items connected with a crime." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1239 (8th ed. 2004).
65. See, e.g., Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551,559 (2004); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 701 (1983);
McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451,455-56 (1948); see also Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250 (1991)
("The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.").
66. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). See generally Jeffrey Hannigan Kuras et al.,
Warrantless Searches and Seizures, 90 GEO. L.J. 1130 (2002) (listing and summarizing exceptions).
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interests furthered by the police conduct with the individual's privacy interest.67
Depending on the nature of the intrusion, the Fourth Amendment requires that the
objective facts sufficed to give the officer probable cause or reasonable suspicion6"
to intrude.69
b. Terry v. Ohio: Searches and Seizures Beget Stops and Frisks
Up until Terry v. Ohio,7" the reasonableness of a search or seizure hinged solely
on a probable cause analysis.7' The Supreme Court in Terry, however, created the
reasonable suspicion standard for situations involving less than a "'technical arrest'
or a 'full-blown search."' 72 After declining to hold that a "stop and frisk" falls
outside the scope of the Fourth Amendment,73 the Court created a dual inquiry for
this new, lesser form of intrusion: "whether the officer's action was justified at its
inception, and whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances
which justified the interference in the first place."74
The Court held that a protective frisk is justified at its inception if an officer is
"able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational
inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant" the intrusion.75 Moreover, the
Court held that the intrusion must be objectively reasonable; that is, "would the
facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search warrant a
man of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate?" 76
Thus, taking into account the government's interest in investigating crime safely,
if"a police officer observes unusual conduct that leads him reasonably to conclude
in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons
67. See, e.g., Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979); see also Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39
(1996) ("Reasonableness.. is measured in objective terms by examining the totality of the circumstances.").
68. Reasonable suspicion is something more than an "inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch,'
but something short of probable cause. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329-30 (1990) (quoting Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968)). For a discussion of the reasonable suspicion standard, see generally 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 9.5(b) (4th ed. 2004). In essence, probable
cause deals with probabilities while reasonable suspicion deals with possibilities. Id. at 480 n.68.
69. In Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 817-18 (1996), the Court held that the government versus
private-interest balancing test is usually not needed when analyzing typical probable cause issues. This is so
because "probable cause to believe the law has been broken 'outbalances' private interest in avoiding police
contact." Id. at 818. Nonetheless, the balancing test is required when the search or seizure is "extraordinary," even
if probable cause exists. Id. (citing Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 (1995) (unannounced entry into home);
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1(1985) (seizure using deadly force); Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985) (physical
penetration of the body); Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984) (entry into home without a warrant)).
70. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
71. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200,207-09 (1979).
72. Terry, 392 U.S. at 19; see Dunaway,442 U.S. at 209-10.
73. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 16-19. The Court determined that a "stop" falls within the ambit of a "seizure."
Id. at 16 ("It must be recognized that whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to
walk away, he has 'seized' that person."). Likewise, the Court declined to find that a "frisk" is not a "search." Id.
[fIt is nothing less than sheer torture of the English language to suggest that a careful
exploration of the outer surfaces of a person's clothing all over his or her body in an attempt to
find weapons is not a "search."...It is a serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person, which
may inflict great indignity and arouse strong resentment, and it is not to be undertaken lightly.
Id. at 16-17.
74. Id. at 20.
75. Id. at 21.
76. Id. at 21-22 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court reasoned that "the Fourth Amendment would
evaporate" if reviewing judges were to simply rely upon the subjective good faith of an officer. Id. at 22.
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with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous," then he may
conduct a frisk.77 Balancing that interest against an individual's interest in avoiding
the "annoying, frightening, and perhaps humiliating experience"" of being
subjected to a frisk, the Court held that the scope of a frisk must be limited to
ascertaining whether a person is armed with weapons that could be used to assault
the officer.7 9
In his concurring opinion, Justice Harlan wanted to "make it perfectly clear that
the right to frisk... depends upon the reasonableness of a forcible stop to investigate
a suspected crime."8 In essence, Justice Harlan was concerned that the Court had
failed to fully analyze whether the initial seizure in order to investigate a crime was
reasonable.8 1
Four years later, in Adams v. Williams,82 the Supreme Court clarified this concern
of Justice Harlan. There, the Court held that an "intermediate response" requiring
less than probable cause is appropriate when an officer is investigating criminal
activity.83 Hence, a "brief stop of a suspicious individual, in order to determine his
identity or to maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more informay be most reasonable in light of the facts known to the officer at the
mation,
,
time. 84
c. The Fourth Amendment on Wheels
Later, in UnitedStates v. Brignoni-Ponce, 5 the Supreme Court applied Adams
to the context of automobiles and held that an officer may stop a moving vehicle86

77. Id. at 30. However, "due weight must be given, not to [the officer's] inchoate and unparticularized
suspicion or 'hunch,' but to the specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light
of his experiences." Id. at 27.
78. ld. at 25.
79. Id. at 29. Nevertheless, if evidence is found during a protective frisk there is no point in prohibiting its
use against the suspect. See id.at 13-15; Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375-76 (1993) (holding that an
officer conducting a valid Terry frisk may seize any object felt that is "immediately apparent" as contraband).
80. Terry, 392 U.S. at 33 (Harlan, J., concurring).
81. See id. at 32. Justice Harlan pointed out that, because the issue in Terry was "whether evidence
produced by a frisk is admissible, [the Court only had] to determine what makes a frisk reasonable." Id. at 31.
Indeed, the majority in Terry viewed the seizure as part and parcel of the search. Although there was no doubt that
Terry was seized, id. at 19 (majority opinion), the Court viewed the seizure as protective rather than investigative
in nature. See id. at 29. Thus, the Court declined to decide whether an investigative seizure could be instituted on
anything less than probable cause. Id. at 19 n. 16.
A person is seized "when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way
restrained the liberty of a citizen." Id. Mere police questioning, however, does not constitute a seizure. Florida v.
Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991).
82. 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
83. Id. at 145.
84. Id. at 146. The Court in Adams also reiterated that the purpose of a frisk is solely for officer safety; it
is not to be conducted as a search for evidence of a crime. See id. Recently, in United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S.
266, 266-73 (2002), the Court made clear that, in reviewing an officer's investigative detention based on
reasonable suspicion, courts must look to the "totality of the circumstances" when determining whether an "officer
has a 'particularized and objective basis' for" making a stop. Id.at 273 (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S.
411, 417-18 (1981)). According to the Supreme Court, requiring consideration of the "totality of the
circumstances" precludes a "divide-and-conquer analysis" and allows officers to draw upon their experience and
training in looking at factors that might, in and of themselves, be innocent. Id. at 273-74.
85. 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
86. Although the defendant in Adams was in a vehicle when seized by the officer, the vehicle was not
moving when the officer approached. See Adams, 407 U.S. at 145.

NEW MEXICO LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 35

on reasonable suspicion when conducting a criminal investigation."s The Court held
that, because the intrusion is limited, criminal investigative stops of vehicles "may
be justified
on facts that do not amount to the probable cause required for an
88
arrest.,
Four years later, in Delawarev. Prouse,9 the Supreme Court ruled on how the
new reasonable suspicion standard should play out in the context of automobile
stops pertaining to traffic violations. There, the Court held that the state's interest
in ensuring safety on its roads does not justify arbitrary stops of automobiles. 9°
Thus, a traffic stop is unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment "[w]hen there
is not probable cause to believe that a driver is violating any one of the multitude
of applicable traffic and equipment regulations--or..
91 .reasonable suspicion that the
driver is unlicensed or his vehicle unregistered.
In Michigan v. Long,92 the Court extended the frisk prong of the stop-and-frisk
doctrine to automobiles when it held that an officer can "frisk" the passenger
compartment of an automobile on reasonable suspicion that its occupants are
dangerous. 93 Moreover, once a police officer has conducted a valid traffic stop, the

87. In Brignoni-Ponce, Border Patrol agents conducting a roving-patrol stop near the Mexican border
stopped a vehicle solely because the occupants appeared to be of Mexican descent. Brignoni-Ponce,422 U.S. at
874-75. A "roving-patrol" stop is to be distinguished from a "fixed-checkpoint" stop. See generally Alfredo
Mirande, Is There a "Mexican Exception " to the FourthAmendment?, 55 FLA. L. REV. 365, 374-81 (2003).
88. Brignoni-Ponce,422 U.S. at 880; see id. at 884 ("[O]fficers on roving patrol may stop vehicles only
if they are aware of specific articulable facts, together with rational inferences from those facts, that reasonably
warrant suspicion that the vehicles contain aliens who may be illegally in the country."). The Court required this
minimum level of suspicion because it was concerned that holding otherwise would subject border residents "to
potentially unlimited interference with their use of the highways, solely at the discretion of Border Patrol officers."
Id. at 882. In Brignoni-Ponce,the Court concluded that the officers' reliance on the single factor ofthe occupants'
Mexican ancestry did not furnish reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was taking place. Id. at 885-86. In
a concurring opinion, Justice Douglas continued his attack on the newly created "suspicion test." See id.at 888-90
(Douglas, J., concurring); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 35-39 (1968) (Douglas, J., concurring). Justice
Douglas was concerned that "the nature of the test permits the police to interfere.. with a multitude of law-abiding
citizens, whose only transgression may be a nonconformist appearance or attitude." Brignoni-Ponce,422 U.S. at
889 (Douglas, J., concurring).
89. 440 U.S. 648 (1979). In Prouse,a police officer pulled a car over for a "spot check"-a purely arbitrary
license and registration check not resulting from any observed traffic violation or suspicion of criminal activity.
Id. at,650-51.
90. See id.at 658-63. The Court pointed out that "[t]his kind of standardless and unconstrained discretion
is the evil the Court has discerned when in previous cases it has insisted that the discretion of the official in the
field be circumscribed, at least to some extent." Id. at 661 (citing Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266,
270 (1973); Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 532-33 (1967)).
91. See id. at 661 (footnote omitted). It should be noted that many courts, including those in New Mexico,
hold that a driver may be pulled over on reasonablesuspicionof a traffic violation. See, e.g., State v. Munoz, 1998NMCA-140, H 8-10, 965 P.2d 349, 352; United States v. Soto, 988 F.2d 1548, 1554 (10th Cir. 1993); see also
Thomas M. Lockney, Justice Beryl Levine: Taking Her Title Seriously in North Dakota CriminalCases, 72 N.D.
L. REV. 967,974-82 (1996). See generallyDavid A. Moran, Traffic Stops, Littering Tickets, andPoliceWarnings:
The Casefor a Fourth Amendment Non-CustodialArrest Doctrine, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1143 (2000). These
courts are, arguably, quite wrong. Although the Supreme Court has muddied the issue by claiming that stopping
a vehicle for a traffic violation is somewhat "analogous" to a Terry investigative stop, see, e.g., Berkemer v.
McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984); see also Moran, supra, at 1153-55, the Court has never stated that a vehicle
may be stopped on reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation. Instead, an officer needs probable cause to stop a
vehicle for violating a simple traffic law, see Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810, 819 (1996); Prouse,440
U.S. at 661, unless there is a reasonable suspicion "that the driver is unlicensed or [the] vehicle [is] unregistered."
Id.
92. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
93. Id. at 1049.
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officer, without any individualized suspicion or justification, may order motorists
from their vehicles.94
d. Consensual Searches
Another exception to the warrant requirement is a consensual search.95 To show
that evidence was obtained during a consensual search, a prosecutor has the burden
of proving that consent was given freely and voluntarily9 6 in light of all the
circumstances.9 7 Although a person has the right to refuse to consent to a search,
"proof of knowledge of the right to refuse... is [not] a prerequisite to demonstrating
a 'voluntary' consent."98 Similarly, persons stopped for a traffic violation need not
be informed that they are free to leave in order for consent to be found voluntary."
The Supreme Court has held that the mere act of refusing a police officer's
request cannot influence that officer's determination of reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity.1"' In the context of a refusal to consent to a search, other courts,
including New Mexico's, have held similarly."' Moreover, most courts consider
this right to refuse a constitutional right.'0 2 Left unsaid by the Supreme Court,
however, is whether a refusal to cooperate can inform any part of an officer's
[T]he search of the passenger compartment of an automobile, limited to those areas in which
a weapon may be placed or hidden, is permissible if the police officer possesses a reasonable
belief based on "specific and articulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences
from those facts, reasonably warrant" the officers in believing that the [motorist] is dangerous
and.. .may gain immediate control of weapons.
Id. (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21).
94. See Pennsylvania v. Mimnims, 434 U.S. 106, 110-11 (1977) (per curiam); see also Maryland v. Wilson,
519 U.S. 408, 414-15 (1997) (extending Mimms to passengers).
95. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973). See generally 4 LAFAVE, supra note 68, § 8;
Kuras, supra note 66, at 1165-77.
96. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 (1968).
97. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227. To determine whether consent was voluntarily given, courts consider
numerous factors. See, e.g., United States v. Chaidez, 906 F.2d 377, 381 (8th Cir. 1990) (listing eleven factors).
See generally 6 LAFAVE, supra note 68, § 8.1.
98. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 232-33. This is unlike the requirement that a suspect be informed of certain
rights after being arrested. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). For a synopsis of Schneckloth, see
generally Steven L. Chanenson, Get the Facts, Jack! Empirical Research and the Changing.Constitutional
Landscape of Consent Searches, 71 TENN. L. REV. 399, 404-07 (2004).
99. Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39-40 (1996). The confluence of a motorist being asked to submit to
a consensual search after a pretextual traffic stop is found in Robinette: "[Tiraffic stops in [Ohio] were regularly
giving way to contraband searches, characterized as consensual, even when officers had no reason to suspect illegal
activity." Id. at 40 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment).
100. See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437 (1991) ("[A] refusal to cooperate, without more, does not
furnish the minimal level of objective justification needed for a detention or seizure."); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S.
491, 498 (1983) ("[A] refusal to listen or answer does not, without more, furnish [reasonable suspicion].").
101. See, e.g., United States v. Wood, 106 F.3d 942, 946 (10th Cir. 1997) ("[lt should go without saying
that consideration of.. .a refusal [to consent to a search] would violate the Fourth Amendment."); State v. Zelinske,
108 N.M. 784,788, 779 P.2d 971,975 (Ct. App. 1989) (holding that a defendant's constitutional right to withdraw
consent to a search does not transform suspicion into probable cause), overruled on other grounds by State v.
Bedolla, 111 N.M. 448, 806 P.2d 588 (Ct. App. 1991); see also Garcia v. State, 103 N.M. 713, 714, 712 P.2d
1375, 1376 (1986) (holding that a refusal to consent to a search of an automobile could not be used to infer guilt
at trial).
102. See, e.g., Zelinske at 788, 779 P.2d at 975. But see Kenneth J. Melilli, The ConsequencesofRefusing
Consent to a Search or Seizure: The Unfortunate Constitutionilizationofan EvidentiaryIssue, 75 S.CAL. L. REv.
901 (2002). Professor Melilli argues, "there is no constitutional right to avoid the introduction [at trial] of evidence
of refusal to consent to a search. In most circumstances, such evidence is inadmissible because it is either irrelevant
or insufficiently relevant to overcome its unfairly prejudicial impact." Id. at 941.
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formation of reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is underway. 1°3 That is, can
an officer consider the demeanor or behavior of a person when that person refuses
to consent to a search as a factor in formulating reasonable suspicion or probable
cause? Some courts have suggested so."° Others have rejected this analysis.'0 5
e. Pretextual Police Conduct
Police action is considered "pretextual" when officers "attemp[t] to use valid
bases of action against citizens... for pursuing other investigatory agendas."1 °6 In
Whren v. United States,10 7 the Supreme Court held that the underlying subjective
motivations of an officer conducting a traffic stop based on probable cause are not
to be considered when determining ifthat seizure is unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment.108 In that case, the petitioners argued that, because automobiles are so
minutely regulated to the extent "that total compliance with traffic and safety rules
is nearly impossible," police could easily use any technical violation of the traffic
code as a pretext for a criminal investigation when reasonable suspicion is lacking. "
As such, they suggested a "would have" test-that is, "whether a police officer,
acting reasonably, would have made the stop for the reason given."" 0

103. United States v. Edmonds, 948 F. Supp. 562, 567 (E.D. Va. 1996) ("[W]hile the Supreme Court has
ruled that a citizen's refusal to consent to a search can never furnish the sole basis for a brief detention and
investigation, it has not yet addressed the question whether a refusal can be part of [its] basis."); Chanenson, supra
note 98, at 401,410-11; see also Rachel Karen Laser, Comment, UnreasonableSuspicion: Relying on Refusals
to Support Terry Stops, 62 U. CHI. L. REv. 1161, 1161 (1995).
104. See United States v. Hyppolite, 65 F.3d 1151, 1158 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that there may be some
cases where the form of a refusal may support probable cause to issue a warrant, but that it cannot be the primary
or prominent factor); United States v. Carter, 985 F.2d 1095, 1098 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (Wald, J., dissenting) (accusing
the majority of considering the manner with which a suspect withdraws consent to support reasonable suspicion
in subjecting a paper bag to a dog sniff); United States v. Wilson, 953 F.2d 116, 126 (4th Cir. 1991) (refusing to
rule that "the form of a denial can never be included as a factor to be considered in determining whether an
investigative stop was justified"); see also Chanenson, supra note 98, at 412-16; cf Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S.
119, 124-25 (2000) (holding that unprovoked flight from police in a high-crime area supports reasonable suspicion
to detain a person).
105. See, e.g., Karnes v. Strutski, 62 F.3d 485, 495-96 (3d Cir. 1995) (concluding that granting consent to
search some items but not others cannot be a factor used to support reasonable suspicion of criminal activity even
when suspect becomes "argumentative and difficult").
106. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 811 (1996); see Patricia Leary & Stephanie Rae Williams,
Toward a State ConstitutionalCheck on Police Discretion to Patrolthe Fourth Amendment's OuterFrontier:A
Subjective Test for Pretextual Seizures, 69 TEMP. L. REV. 1007, 1008 (1996) (defining pretext as "a legal
justification that is used to mask the real, legally unjustifiable motive").
107. 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
108. See id. at 809-13. In Whren, two African-American men were pulled over by plain-clothed police
officers in an unmarked car for failing to signal and for driving at an "unreasonable" speed. Id. at 808. The
occupants were arrested after one of the officers approached and saw two bags of crack cocaine in plain view. Id.
at 808-09. Police regulations provided that officers in unmarked vehicles were to only conduct a traffic stop if the
"violation [was] so grave as to pose an immediate threat to the safety of others." Id. at 815 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
109. Id.at 810. In essence, the argument was that an officer lacking reasonable suspicion that a serious crime
was being committed, see supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text, would nevertheless be able to stop an
automobile because of the overinclusiveness of traffic codes. See, e.g., NMSA 1978, § 66-7-318(A) (1978) ("The
driver of a motor vehicle shall not follow another vehicle more closely than is reasonable and prudent, having due
regard for the speed of such vehicles and the traffic upon and the condition of the highway."). Moreover, the
petitioners pointed out the danger of police using minor traffic violations to mask racially discriminatory traffic
stops. See Whren, 517 U.S. at 810.
110. Whren,517U.S.at810.
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The Court rejected this approach and, by affirming the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit, adopted a "could have" test. I Because "[s]ubjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment
analysis,"". the Court held that "the Fourth Amendment's concern with 'reasonableness' allows certain actions to be taken in certain circumstances, whatever the
subjective intent" of the officer." 3 The Supreme Court distinguished two cases
where it found that pretextual conduct did make a difference-the key distinguish"address[ed] the validity of a search conducted in the
ing factor being that the cases
" 14
absence of probable cause. '
2. The Exclusionary Rule
To effectuate the guarantee embodied in the Fourth Amendment, the U.S.
Supreme Court developed the exclusionary rule." 5 Generally, this rule means that
when criminal evidence is obtained as a result of an unreasonable search or seizure
it cannot be used against the person whose Fourth Amendment rights were
violated." 16 InLinkletterv. Walker," 7 the Court determined that the primary purpose
of the rule is to deter police misconduct and "that this purpose would [not] be
advanced by" retrospective application." 8 In extendingLinkletterprospectively, the

111. See id.at 809. The court of appeals held that "a traffic stop is permissible as long as a reasonable officer
in the same circumstances could have stopped the car for the suspected traffic violation." United States v. Whren,
53 F.3d 371, 375 (D.C. Cir. 1995); see also Leary & Williams, supra note 106, at 1014-19 (describing the preWhren tests that courts of appeals used for analyzing pretextual stops).
112. Whren, 517U.S. at813.
113. Id. at 814 (citing United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236 (1973) (allowing search of person
incident to arrest even though officer did not indicate a subjective belief that arrestee was armed); Gustafson v.
Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 266 (1973) (holding the same)).
114. Whren, 517 U.S. at 811 (discussing Florida v. Wells, 496 U.S. 1 (1990); New York v. Burger, 482 U.S.
691 (1987); Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987)). The searches in Wells and Bertinewere inventory searches.
When police impound a vehicle they are allowed to search the car in order "to protect an owner's property while
it is in the custody of the police, to insure against claims of lost, stolen, or vandalized property, and to guard the
police from danger." Bertine, 479 U.S. at 372. The search in Burger was an administrative inspection. "An
administrative inspection is the inspection of business premises conducted by authorities responsible for enforcing
a pervasive regulatory scheme...." Whren, 517 U.S. at 811 n.2.
The Court, however, did not address whether the subjective motivation of an officer acting on
reasonablesuspicion can be considered in determining the reasonableness of an officer's actions. At least one state
court has made this distinction. See State v. Varnado, 582 N.W.2d 886, 892 (Minn. 1998) (stating that the "pretext
factor is relevant to determining whether [a frisk] is reasonable" since a frisk is based on less than probable cause).
Recently, in United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001), the Court signaled that it would not
necessarily limit Whren to situations involving probable cause. There, the Court held that a warrantless search
"supported by reasonable suspicion and authorized by a condition of probation" was reasonable. Id. at 122. Quoting
Whren, the Court stated, "we have been unwilling to entertain Fourth Amendment challenges based on the actual
motivations of individual officers." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). In his concurring opinion, however,
Justice Souter would have "reserve[d] the question whether Whren's holding that 'subjective intentions play no
role in ordinary probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis' should extend to searches based only upon reasonable
suspicion." Id. at 123 (Souter, J., concurring) (quoting Whren, 517 U.S. at 813).
115. For a thorough discussion of the exclusionary rule, see generally Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp v.
Ohio andBeyond: The Origins,DevelopmentandFuture ofthe ExclusionaryRule in Search-and-SeizureCases,
83 COLUM. L. REv. 1365 (1983).
116. See generally Stewart, supranote 115, at 1372-77 (discussing origins of exclusionary rule).
117. 381 U.S. 618(1965).
118. Id.at637.
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Court has refused to apply the exclusionary rule when doing so will not effectively
deter police misconduct." 9
But what happens when a Fourth Amendment violation produces information
that, in turn, leads to direct criminal evidence? In Wong Sun v. United States,120 the
Supreme Court held that "[t]he exclusionary prohibition extends as well to the
indirect as the direct products of [illegal searches]." 12 ' Thus, "verbal evidence which
derives so immediately from [a Fourth Amendment violation] is no less the 'fruit'
'
of official illegality than the more common tangible fruits of the [violation]." 122
Moreover, it is immaterial whether this verbal "fruit" is inculpatory or
exculpatory.' 23 The Court, however, refused to "hold that all evidence is 'fruit of the
poisonous tree' simply because it would not have come to light but for the illegal
actions of the police."' 2 4 Rather, the exclusionary rule will not apply if "the
' 25
Government [has] learned of the evidence 'from an independent source,""
. or if
' 126
taint."
the
dissipate
to
as
attenuated
so
the "evidence has 'become
B. New Mexico's Article A1 Section 10
New Mexico courts must, of course, follow the U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment.' 27 They may, however, offer broader protections
to those in New Mexico under the state constitutional analog to the Fourth

119. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 918-22 (1984) (holding that the exclusionary rule is
inappropriate when an officer acting in good faith performs a search based on a faulty search warrant because there
is no police misconduct to deter); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 349-50 (1974) (declining to apply
exclusionary rule at grand jury proceedings because of the "minimal advance in the deterrence of police
misconduct"). The scope of New Mexico's exclusionary rule is broader. See infra notes 135-138 and
accompanying text.
120. 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
121. Id.at 484 (citing Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920)). In Silverthorne,the
police conducted an illegal search and photographed and copied incriminating documents. Silverthorne,251 U.S.
at 390-91. After the district court ordered the return of the documents, the district attorney, using the knowledge
gained from the search, subpoenaed the documents. Id. Writing for the majority, Justice Holmes held that to allow
the prosecutor to use the knowledge gained from the illegal act in this manner would "reduc[e] the Fourth
Amendment to a form of words." Id. at 392. Importantly, "[t]he essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition
of evidence in a certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used before the Court but that it
shall not be used at all." Id. (emphasis added).
122. Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 485.
123. Id. at487.
124. Id. at487-88.
125. Id. at 487 (quoting Silverthorne Lumber, 251 U.S. at 385).
126. Id. (quoting Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939)). There are
three factors relevant to determining whether statements or evidence, which officers obtain as
a result of an illegal seizure, are [sufficiently attenuated]: 1) the temporal proximity of the
statements to the Fourth Amendment violation; 2) the existence of intervening causes between
the violation and the statements; and 3) the purpose or flagrancy of the official misconduct.
United States v. Olivares-Rangel, 324 F. Supp. 2d 1218, 1223 (D.N.M. 2004) (citing Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S.
590, 603-04 (1975)). Another related exception to the general rule is the "inevitable discovery" doctrine. Evidence
illegally obtained is not to be suppressed "[i]f the prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that
the information ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means." Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S.
431, 444 (1984).
127. See Kerv. California, 374 U.S. 23, 33-34 (1963).
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Amendment 2'-article H, section 10.29 In essence, the Fourteenth Amendment's
application of the Fourth Amendment to the states establishes the bare minimum,
but not the maximum, of protection against overreaching police conduct. 13
Moreover, when a New Mexico court relies solely on its own constitutional
prohibition against unreasonable searches and/or seizures, the U.S. Supreme Court
cannot review that decision. 3 ' Over the past three decades, numerous states have
interpreted their constitutional analogs more broadly than the Fourth Amendment.'32
State v. Cordova'3 3 marked the first of New Mexico's many departures from the
Fourth Amendment. In that case, the court rejected the U.S. Supreme Court's
"totality of the circumstances" test used to determine whether information provided
by a confidential informant in an affidavit in support of a search warrant established
probable cause.' 34
Later, in State v. Gutierrez,3 ' the New Mexico Supreme Court clarified the
purpose of New Mexico's exclusionary rule by rejecting the U.S. Supreme Court's
holding in UnitedStates v. Leon.'36 The court in Gutierrezdetermined that the New
Mexico exclusionary rule is not "a mere 'judicial remedy"' designed to deter police
misconduct or preserve judicial integrity. 137 Rather, the court held that the

128. See Oregon v. Haas, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975) ("[A] State is free as a matter of its own law to impose
greater restrictions [on] police activity than those this Court holds to be necessary upon federal constitutional
standards.").
129. Article I, section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution provides.
The people shall be secure in their persons, papers, homes and effects from unreasonable
searches and seizures, and no warrant to search any place, or seize any person or thing, shall
issue, without describing the place to be searched, or the persons or things to be seized, nor
without a written showing of probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation.
130. See James A. Gardner, State Constitutional Rights as Resistance to National Power: Toward a
Functional Theory of State Constitutions, 91 GEO. L.J. 1003, 1031 ("States...may accord as much or more
protection to individual rights as does the U.S. Constitution, but they may not accord less.").
131. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-41 (1983) (requiring a state court to make a "plain
statement" that it is not relying on federal grounds so as to protect a decision from federal review).
132. See Gardner,supranote 130, at 1028-32 (providing an overview of state constitutional jurisprudence).
See generally William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutionsand the Protectionof IndividualRights, 90 HARV. L.
REV. 489 (1977). Justice Brennan was concerned with the Supreme Court's then recent trend to shrink the
protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 495. As an example, he noted with disapproval the same
cases that the Court in Whren later relied upon to uphold the constitutionality of pretextual traffic stops: "[The
Court] has declined to read the fourth amendment to prohibit searches of an individual by police officers following
a stop [and arrest] for a traffic violation, although there exists no probable cause to believe the individual has
committed any other legal infraction." Id. at 497 (citing United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973); Gustafson
v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973)); see also supra note 113 and accompanying text.
133. 109 N.M. 211,784 P.2d 30 (1989).
134. Id. at 217, 784 P.2d at 36; see Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230 (1983). After noting that New
Mexico's application of the previous rule "has not proved to be a problem," Cordova, 109 N.M. at 216, 784 P.2d
at 35, the court in Cordova decided to retain the prior two-prong test as embodied in New Mexico Rule 5-211 (E)
that Gates had overruled. Id. at 217, 784 P.2d at 36; see also Rule 5-211(E) NMRA (providing that an affidavit
in support of a search warrant containing hearsay must establish a substantial basis for both (1) "believing the
source of the hearsay to be credible," and (2) "believing that there is a factual basis for the information furnished").
135. 116 N.M. 431, 863 P.2d 1052 (1993).
136. 468 U.S. 897 (1984). Relying on the deterrence purpose of the exclusionary rule, see supraPart 1I.A.2,
the Supreme Court in Leon held that evidence obtained during the execution of an invalid search warrant would
not be excluded so long as the executing officers acted in good faith. Leon, 468 U.S. at 918.
137. Gutierrez, 116 N.M. at 446, 863 P.2d at 1067.
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exclusionary rule is constitutionally required in New Mexico whenever a citizen's
3
right to be kept free from unreasonable searches and seizures is violated. '
Although a full discussion of how New Mexico has deviated from Federal Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence is beyond the scope of this Note, one additional case,
State v. Gomez, 139 requires mentioning. In Gomez, the New Mexico Supreme Court
formally adopted the "interstitial" approach to independent state constitutional
analysis. 4 Under this approach, a New Mexico court will only proceed to analyze
a defendant's claim under the state constitution if there is no relief under the Fourth
Amendment. 41
However, notwithstanding the outcry by commentators following the U.S.
Supreme Court's Whren decision, 142 New Mexico courts, unlike those of some other
states, 143 have neglected to decide whether pretextual police conduct is reasonable
under the state constitution. 44 That is, although New Mexico may have implicitly
4
adopted the teaching of Whren and its progeny under the Fourth Amendment,' as
146
it necessarily must, it simply has not considered the question under article II,
section 10.
IV. STATE V. VANDENBERG: THE OPINION
In an opinion authored by Justice Bosson, with Chief Justice Maes and Justice
Serna concurring, the New Mexico Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals on
138. See id. at 446-47, 863 P.2d at 1067-68. Many possibilities resulting from Gutierrez have remained
unexplored in New Mexico. For instance, relying on the deterrence purpose of the federal exclusionary rule, the
Ninth Circuit has held that evidence obtained from an illegal search can be used to prove knowledge and intent of
the defendant when there is no nexus between the prosecuting office and the police that conducted the illegal
search. See United States v. Basinger, 60 F.3d 1400, 1407 (9th Cir. 1995). In New Mexico, the exclusionary rule
inherent within article IL section 10 should preclude the use of evidence obtained in a similarly unconstitutional
manner.

139. 1997-NMSC-006, 932 P.2d 1.
140. Id. 21, 932 P.2d at 7. For description of the various approaches to state constitutional analysis, see
generally Rachel A. Van Cleave, State ConstitutionalInterpretationand Methedology, 28 N.M. L. REv. 199,
206-19(1988).
141. Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, 19, 932 P.2dat 7.
142. See, e.g., Leary& Williams, supranote 106, at 1025 ("Whren is a rickety piece ofjudicial scholarship.
It is built upon unreasoned distinctions, perversions of precedent, a question-begging unarticulated and unsupported
premise, bootstrapping, logical inconsistencies, and a narrow vision of the Fourth Amendment."); see also supra
notes 107-114 and accompanying text.
143. See, e.g., State v. Sullivan, 74 S.W.3d 215, 220-21 (Ark. 2002) (holding that "pretextual
arrests-arrests that would not have occurred butfor an ulterior investigative motive--are unreasonable police
conduct warranting application of the exclusionary rule" under its state constitution); State v. Robinson, 767
N.E.2d 638, 644-45 (N.Y. 2001) (concluding that New York's constitution does not offer more protection than
Whren); State v. Ladson, 979 P.2d 833, 842 n.10 (Wash. 1999) (en banc) (rejecting Whren and holding that
pretextual traffic stops violate Washington's state constitution).
144. Before Vandenberg, the closest the New Mexico Supreme Court got to analyzing the issue of pretext
was in the case of State v. Reed, 1998-NMSC-030, 964 P.2d 113. In Reed, one of the issues was "whether a law
enforcement officer who wants to search a vehicle based on a hunch that the vehicle contains illegal drugs may
validly stop the vehicle based on personal observations of violations of the Motor Vehicle Code." Id. 1 1,964 P.2d
at 113. Although the court in Reed thought it was an "interesting question[]," it did not reach the issue because the
defendant's conviction was reversed on other grounds. Id. 2, 964 P.2d at 113. At any rate, it is unclear ifanystate
constitutional issue was preserved. See id. 12, 964 P.2d at 115.
145. See, e.g., State v. Martinez, 1997-NMCA-048, 15, 940 P.2d 1200, 1204 (citing Whren in a case
determined under the Fourth Amendment for the proposition that "[tihe state of mind of the.. .officer is not
dispositive in determining the constitutionality of a search or seizure").
146. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
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the basis that "Officer Roberts' frisk... did not violate the Fourth Amendment.' 4 7
Justice Chavez concurring, dissented. 141 Justice Chavez also
Justice Minzner, with
149
authored a dissent.
A. The Majority
Interestingly, rather than analyzing the case chronologically, the majority
analyzed it in reverse by starting with the second stop by Officer Roberts and the
ensuing frisk. 5 ° It then briefly addressed the constitutionality of the first stop by
Deputy House and explained how the information in the BOLO report could factor
into Officer Roberts' fear for his safety. 5 ' The majority concluded by briefly
discussing why it would not consider the state constitutional question.'52
1. The Second Stop and Frisk
The court began its analysis of "this very close case"'5 by quickly ruling that the
second stop of the Monte Carlo was constitutional because Officer Roberts "reasonably suspected that Swanson had violated a traffic law."' 54 It then noted that "a
weapons frisk must be strictly circumscribed by the exigencies thatjustify it,"'5 and
that the inquiry into whether an officer acted reasonably when faced with exigent
circumstances is an objective one.' 56 To find that Officer Roberts acted reasonably,
the court turned to the "particularly helpful"' 57 case of State v. Chapman. 8
The majority relied on three factors to find Chapman analogous. First, in both
cases "the drivers were more nervous than most people... stopped for a routine
traffic offense," and, in addition, the officers in both cases pointed to facts other
than this "extreme nervousness" that made them fear for their safety.' 59 Second, the
majority noted that the "principle" underlying its opinion and Chapman'swas the
147. State v. Vandenberg, 2003-NMSC-030, 55, 81 P.3d 19, 33.
148. Id. E 57-68, 81 P.3d at 33-36 (Minzner, J., dissenting).
149. Id. I169-81, 81 P.3d at 36-39 (Chavez, J., dissenting).
150. Id. T1 20-36, 81 P.3d at 25-28 (majority opinion).
151. Id. 4H 37-50, 81 P.3d at 29-32.
152. Id. T1 51-54, 81 P.3d at 32-33.
153. Id. 133,81 P.3d at 28.
154. Id. 21, 81 P.3d at 25 (agreeing with the district court and court of appeals). Although it may not have
mattered in this case, it should be reiterated that, under the Fourth Amendment, an officer needs probable cause,
not reasonable suspicion, to stop a vehicle for a traffic violation. See supra note 91.
155. Vandenberg, 2003-NMSC-030, 123, 81 P.3d at 26 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26 (1968)).
156. Id. (citing State v. Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, 140, 932 P.2d 1, 12).
157. Id. 127, 81 P.3d at 26.
158. 1999-NMCA-106, 986 P.2d 1122. In Chapman, an officer pulled a vehicle over for a seatbelt violation
and had the driver get out of his car after noticing the driver's shaking hand and inability to make eye contact. Id.
2, 986 P.2d at 1123-24. After noticing the driver becoming even more nervous, the officer then asked him if he
had any weapons. The driver responded that he did not. Finally, after the driver questioned what the stop was about
"in a higher-pitched voice, and in a nervous and aggressive manner," the officer conducted a pat-down frisk. id.
1 2-3, 986 P.2d at 1124. The court in Chapmandeemed the frisk reasonable since, "[i]nstead ofjust describing
Defendant as nervous, the deputy identified specific behaviors and changes in Defendant's demeanor and attitude
that explain[ed] why he believed that Defendant might be armed and dangerous." Id. 16,986 P.2d at 1126. Those
"specific facts" supported the reasonableness of the frisk. See id.
159. Vandenberg,2003-NMSC-030,1 28, 81 P.3d at 26-27. The court is not clear about what "other specific
observations" Officer Roberts pointed to. Presumably it was the information in the BOLO report. According to the
court, Swanson's and Vandenberg's "excessive movement, coupled with the information he received in the BOLO,
made Officer Roberts concerned... for his safety." Id. 29, 81 P.3d at 27.
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same: the officers were able to articulatewhy a frisk was necessary. 6 ' Finally, the
court determined that, as in Chapman, the situation escalated gradually and the
officer proceeded incrementally before initiating a frisk.' 6 '
Having analogized its facts to those in Chapman, the majority held that, under
the totality of the circumstances, Officer Roberts' belief that Swanson and
Vandenberg may have been armed and dangerous was reasonable enough tojustify
a protective frisk.' 62 Moreover, the majority adopted as a rule of law that, when
reviewing similar cases in the future, courts should look to the officer's ability to
articulate why nervousness caused a fear of safety, rather than the degree of
nervousness a suspect displays.'6 3
Before proceeding to explain how the information in the BOLO report could
factor into the reasonableness of Officer Roberts' fear,'" Justice Bosson took pains
the protective pat down" and
to make clear that "safety, and safety alone, justified ...
that "[t]his was not a search for evidence."' 65 Furthermore, the court emphasized
that a police officer may not ordinarily conduct a frisk during a routine traffic stop;
a protective frisk is only valid when the officer "meet[s] the exacting burden of
presenting exigent circumstances, in sufficient detail and with convincing
sincerity."' 6 6
2. The First Stop and the BOLO
The majority in Vandenberg recognized that Officer Roberts relied on Deputy
House's BOLO report as a justification for conducting the pat-down.'6 7 Hence, the
majority had to squarely face the issue of Swanson's refusal to consent to the dog
sniff.'68 Specifically, the court noted that "[i]f Deputy House obtained information
illegally and then passed it along to Officer Roberts, who relied on that information
in his own assessment
of Defendants' behavior, then a motion to suppress may have
169
been in order."'

160. Id. This articulation consisted of Officer Roberts testifying that, based on information gleaned during
his police training, he believed that Swanson's movements meant he was "trying to expel nervous energy." This
expulsion of energy could have been an indicator that Swanson and Vandenberg were in a "fight or flight mode"
and that this may have been a precursor to unpredictable, dangerous behavior. Id. 1 29, 81 P.3d at 27 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
161. Id. 130, 81 P.3d at 27.
162. Id. (adopting Judge Pickard's dissent); see Vandenberg, 2002-NMCA-066, 1 34, 48 P.3d 92, 101
(Pickard, J., dissenting).
163. Vandenberg, 2003-NMSC-030, 31, 81 P.3d at 27.
164. See supra note 159.
165. Vandenberg,2003-NMSC-030 33, 81 P.3d at 28. The majority stated that "[t]he officers did not try
to make a case for suspicion of drug possession, and with good reason. Nothing.. .justified a frisk, much less a full
blown-search, for evidence of any crime." Id.
166. Id. 132, 81 P.3d at 27-28.
167. Id. 37, 81 P.3d at 29 (quoting Officer Roberts' testimony that his nervousness was "based on what
[he] observed.. .as well as the radio transmission [he] had received").
168. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
169. Vandenberg, 2003-NMSC-030, 139, 81 P.3d at 29.
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a. The Legality of the First Stop
To find the first stop by Deputy House constitutional, the court analogized its
facts to those in City ofAlbuquerque v. Haywood.7 ' The court reasoned that, just
as the officer in Haywood was mistaken that the vehicle was missing tags, Officer
House mistakenly believed that the Monte Carlo was lacking a license plate and,
thus, was in violation of section 66-3-18(A) of the Motor Vehicle Code.'' Because
the defendants did not produce "photos or other kinds of demonstrative evidence"
to dissuade the trial court, the majority deferred to that court's determination that
Deputy House testified truthfully.'72
b. Finding Fear in the BOLO
Turning its attention to Swanson's refusal of the dog sniff and the ensuing BOLO
advisory, the court considered two things. First, the court had to decide "whether
any of this information was passed along.. .unlawfully."' 73 Then, if the relaying of
information was lawful, the question became "whether Officer Roberts' reliance on
the BOLO information contaminate[d] the weapons frisk that followed."' 74

170. 1998-NMCA-029, 954 P.2d 93. Haywoodwas a case in which an officer stopped a vehicle because the
officer did not see a license plate or temporary tag. Only in approaching the vehicle and coming within two to three
feet of the car did the officer realize that the vehicle had a valid temporary tag, but that the car's darkly tinted
windows obscured it. Id.9t 11-12, 954 P.2d at 96-97. The court in Haywoodheld that, under those circumstances,
the stop was not arbitrary; hence, it did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Id. 1 12, 954 P.2d at 97 (citing State
v. Reynolds, 119 N.M. 383, 386, 890 P.2d 1315, 1318 (1995)). It then went on to hold that, once validly stopped,
neither the Fourth Amendment nor article IL section 10 precluded the officer from requesting identification from
the driver since such further detention was de minimis. Id. 13, 954 P.2d at 97.
171. Vandenberg, 2003-NMSC-030, T 40-41, 81 P.3d at 29-30.
The registration plate shall be attached to the rear of the vehicle for which it is issued....The
plate shall be securely fastened at all times in a fixed horizontal position at a height of not less
than twelve inches from the ground, measuring from the bottom of the plate. It shall be in a
place and position so as to be clearly visible, and it shall be maintained free from foreign
material and in a condition to be clearly legible.
NMSA 1978, § 66-3-18(A) (1998).
172. Vandenberg, 2003-NMSC-030, 42, 81 P.3d at 30.
173. Id. 44,81 P.3dat30.
174. Id. In a footnote, the court pointed out that the defendants had not preserved any claim as to whether
the sniff request unlawfully exceeded the scope of the stop. Id. 44 n.3, 81 P.3d at 30 n.3. To expand the scope
of a traffic stop, an officer needs reasonable suspicion that illegal activity above and beyond what justified the stop
is involved. See, e.g., United States v. Sullivan, 138 F.3d 126, 131 (4th Cir. 1998); see also State v. Taylor, 1999NMCA-022, I 20-21, 973 P.2d 246, 252-53 (holding that questioning a motorist about drugs and alcohol was
improper when the officer had no reasonable suspicion that the motorist had drugs or alcohol in the car). On the
other hand, the court also questioned whether Swanson had a right to refuse the dog sniff in the first place.
Vandenberg, 2003-NMSC-030, 45 n.4, 81 P.3d at 31 n.4. Under the Fourth Amendment, a dog sniff of the
exterior of an automobile is not a "search" since an individual lacks a reasonable expectation of privacy in public
odors. Id. (citing State v. Cleave, 2001-NMSC-031, 12, 33 P.3d 633, 636; State v. Villanueva, 110 N.M. 359,
361, 796 P.2d 252, 254 (Ct. App. 1990)); see City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32,40 (2000). The court
reasoned that, if no such right existed in the first place, officers might be free to draw any relevant inferences from
a refusal to consent to such a non-search. Vandenberg, 2003-NMSC-030, 45 n.4, 81 P.3d at 31 n.4. However,
since in this case "no improper inferences were drawn" from Swanson's refusal, the court neglected to answer that
question. Id.
After Vandenberg was decided, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Illinois v. Caballes, 125 S. Ct. 834
(2005). In that case, the Court held that if a car is validly stopped, the Fourth Amendment does not preclude an
officer from conducting a dog sniff as a matter of routine so long as the durationof the stop is not extended. See
id. at 837-38. Here, the duration of the initial stop of the Monte Carlo was extended by the request for the dog
sniff-Deputy House had already told Swanson that he was free to leave before requesting permission to run the
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In tackling the first question, the court found that Deputy House had merely
informed Officer Roberts that "he thought Defendants were acting suspiciously. He
did not pass judgment on whether Defendants possessed drugs...."' " Furthermore,
the court found that there is no law that would preclude Deputy House from sharing
relevant information "that may later come into play and endanger another
officer."' 76
In order to answer whether the frisk was "contaminated" by Officer Roberts'
reliance on the BOLO, the majority severed the information contained in the report
into two parts. One part was "relevant" and the other was "neutral" or, in other
words, "irrelevant."' 77 The "relevant" part of the information Deputy House
conveyed consisted of the behaviorof Swanson in refusing to consent to the sniff.'78
The irrelevant, or "neutral," fact conveyed to Officer Roberts in the BOLO report
was the presumed constitutional refusal of the dog sniff itself.'79
In the process of dividing the BOLO report into relevant and irrelevant
components, the court created and relied upon the following syllogism: (1) "It [is]
self-evident that Defendant's refusal is not a probative fact of guilt, suspicion, or
' (2) "Defendants' refusal should not be considered in determining
dangerousness"; 80
whether Officer Roberts had reasonable and articulable suspicion that Defendants
were armed and dangerous";' 8' (3) "Therefore, in determining whether Officer
we
Roberts had reasonable suspicion to believe that Defendants were 18dangerous,
2
do not consider Defendants' refusal to consent as a relevant fact.'
In a nutshell, the majority found that, in concluding that his safety was in danger,
Officer Roberts had relied on his own observations coupled with relevant

dog around the car. See Vandenberg,2003-NMSC-030,14, 81 P.3d at 22; see also Snow v. State, 578 A.2d 816,
827-28 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1990) (holding that detention of a vehicle for a dog-sniff without reasonable suspicion
after the conclusion of a valid traffic stop violates the Fourth Amendment). It should be pointed out that a dog sniff
is also not considered a search under article H, section 10. See Villanueva at 363, 796 P.2d at 256. But see State
v. Tackitt, 67 P.3d 295, 302-03 (Mont. 2003) (holding that an exterior canine sniff of the tunk of a car is a search
under Montana's state constitution).
175. Vandenberg, 2003-NMSC-030, 44, 81 P.3d at 30. Moreover, Deputy House "did not ask Officer
Roberts to detain Defendants... .He merely shared his impressions with another law enforcement official." Id.
176. Id.145, 81 P.3dat 30-31.
177. See id.( 45-47, 81 P.3d at 30-32.
178. See id. 145, 81 P.3d at 30-31 (citing United States v. Hyppolite, 65 F.3d 1151, 1158 (4th Cir. 1995);
United States v. Carter, 985 F.2d 1095, 1097 (D.C. Cir. 1993); United States v. Wilson, 953 F.2d 116, 126 (4th
Cir. 1991); United States v. Riley, 927 F.2d 1045, 1050 (8th Cir. 1991)). The cited cases hold that behavior
exhibited by a suspect in refusing to consent to a search can factor into an analysis of whether the expansion of the
scope of an investigatory stop is reasonable. See supra notes 103-105 and accompanying text. Strangely, the court
also cited two cases that have contrary holdings. See Vandenberg, 2003-NMSC-030, 45, 81 P.3d at 31 (citing
People v. Haley, 41 P.3d 666, 676 (Colo. 2001); Karnes v. Strutski, 62 F.3d 485, 495-96 (3d Cir. 1995)).
179. See Vandenberg, 2003-NMSC-030, 146, 81 P.3d at 31-32 (citing Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429,
437 (1991); Forida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498 (1983); United States v. Wood, 106 F.3d 942, 946 (10th Cir.
1997); Garcia v. State, 103 N.M. 713, 714, 712 P.2d 1375, 1376 (1986); State v. Zelinske, 108 N.M. 784, 788,
779 P.2d 971,975 (Ct. App. 1989), overruledon othergrounds by State v. Bedolla, 111 N.M. 448, 806 P.2d 588
(Ct. App. 1991)). These cases hold that a refusal to consent, by itself, cannot be used by an officer to support an
inference of guilt or suspicion. The court also referenced Professor Melilli's article, which argued that refusing to
consent is an evidentiary issue, not a constitutional right. See Melilli, supra note 102.
180. Vandenberg, 2003-NMSC-030, 46, 81 P.3d at 31.
181. Id.
182. Id. 47, 81 P.3dat 32.
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information contained in the BOLO report. 83 According to the court, since that
combined information was objectively sufficient to produce a fear in Officer
Roberts, "it would be unreasonable for [it] to suppress the fruits of those
suspicions" simply because of the inclusion of "one irrelevant fact" in the BOLO.'84
The majority concluded that the outcome would have been "very different" had
Swanson and Vandenberg "established that the officers' claims were pretextual,
fabricated as a means of retaliating against them for the exercise of their
constitutional rights."' 85 However, the court "[a]ssum[ed] Officer Roberts [had]
acted in good faith" since there was sufficient evidence for the district court to
conclude that he had done so.' 86
3. The State Constitutional Claim
In the district court and on appeal, Vandenberg argued that the stop and frisk by
Officer Roberts was pretextual; that is, Officer Roberts' motivations in stopping and
frisking Swanson and Vandenberg were fueled by a desire to investigate and search
for contraband-a desire that was not supported by reasonable suspicion. 8 7
Acknowledging that the Fourth Amendment allows pretextual police conduct, he
argued that New Mexico should not condone such behavior under article II, section
10.188

The court, however, declined Vandenberg's invitation to elucidate on and clarify
the state of pretext in New Mexico. This was because "the district court believed
Officer Roberts, as it was entitled to do, and did not find anything pretextual about
either Officer Roberts' stop or the protective frisk.', 189 Hence, the claim lacked
"factual foundation" and, being "an abstract question," was not considered. 9
B. The Dissents
1. Justice Minzner: Distinguishing Chapman
Justice Minzner, with Justice Chavez concurring, dissented from the majority's
opinion. 1'In essence, while willing to assume that Officer Roberts was subjectively
concerned about his safety, Justice Minzner believed that his fear was objectively

183. Id. 149, 81 P.3d at 32.
184. Id.
185. Id. 50,81 P.3dat32.
186. Id. A motion to suppress is a mixed question of fact and law. State v. Werner, 117 N.M. 315,317, 871
P.2d 971, 973 (1994); State v. Attaway, 117 N.M. 141, 144-46, 870 P.2d 103, 106-08 (1994) (overruling State
v. Sanchez, 88 N.M. 402, 540 P.2d 1291 (1975)). A trial court's historical facts and credibility determinations are
upheld if there is substantial evidence supporting that finding. Attaway, 117 N.M. at 144, 970 P.2d at 106. The trial
court's application of those facts to the law is reviewed de novo. Id. Courts have long struggled with the
complexities inherent in reviewing motions to suppress involving so-called mixed questions of fact and law. See
6 LAFAVE, supra note 68, § 11.7(c).
187. See Vandenberg, 2003-NMSC-030, 52, 81 P.3d at 33; Defendant-Respondent's Answer Brief at
31-35, State v. Vandenberg, 2003-NMSC-030, 81 P.3d 19 (No. 27,509); see also supra Part Ill.A. .e.
188. See Vandenberg,2003-NMSC-030, I52, 81 P.3d at 33.
189. Id. 53, 81 P.3d at 33.
190. Id.
191. Id. V 57-68, 81 P.3d at 33-36 (Minzner, J., dissenting).
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unreasonable.' 92 For her, the important point in Chapman was the fact that the
officer in that case could link his concern for safety to his question regarding
weapons.' 93 As such, Justice Minzner claimed that "[t]he frisk was not automatically justified simply because Officer Roberts asked Defendant Swanson if he
had any weapons."' 94 Moreover, she argued that the majority erroneously
analogized the incremental approach the officer in Chapman took to the instant
case.' 95 Justice Minzner concluded by noting that Officer Roberts, if genuinely
concerned about his safety even after receiving a negative response about weapons,
could have simply ordered Swanson and Vandenberg out of the car without
conducting a frisk. 96
2. Justice Chavez: Distinguishing Haywood
Beyond adding to the evidence he thought relevant to Justice Minzner's "totality
of the circumstances" test concerning the frisk,' 97 Justice Chavez argued that the
first stop by Deputy House was illegal.'9 8 Like the majority, Justice Chavez would
have accepted the trial court's determination that Deputy House, at least initially,
subjectively believed that the Monte Carlo was missing tags. 9 9 However, rather
than deferring to the trial court on the legal question of whether that belief was
reasonable, he would have concluded that Deputy House's initial suspicion
concerning the license plate was not objectively reasonable.2"0 Justice Chavez
claimed that "Deputy House's conclusory statement that the license plate was not
clearly visible was refuted by the specific, articulable facts testified to by Officer
Roberts."' ' Hence, he agreed with the district court that the first stop was "fishy";
he did not, however, think it to be objectively reasonable.2 2

192. See id. 1 60, 81 P.3d at 34.
193. Id. 1 62, 81 P.3d at 35. In Chapman, the defendant responded in an "anxious and aggressive manner"
to the question of whether he was in possession of weapons. See Chapman, 1999-NMCA-106, U 17-18,986 P.2d
at 1126-27. In this case, however, Swanson and Vandenberg simply responded that they did not have weapons on
them. See Vandenberg, 2003-NMSC-030, 1 10, 81 P.3d at 23. Immediately thereafter, Officer Roberts ordered
them out of the car to submit to a frisk. Id.
194. Vandenberg, 2003-NMSC-030, 62, 81 P.3d at 35 (Minzner, J., dissenting) (citing City of Albuquerque
v. Haywood, 1998-NMCA-029, 17, 954 P.2d 93, 98 (holding that the officer was not automatically justified in
detaining and frisking a motorist who responded in the affirmative to questions about weapons)). Interestingly, the
majority used Haywood to justify the legality of the first stop, see id. 41, 81 P.3d at 29, but did not cite the case
during its frisk analysis.
195. Vandenberg, 2003-NMSC-030, U 64-66, 81 P.3d at 35-36 (Minzner, J., dissenting); see supra note
158.
196. Vandenberg, 2003-NMSC-030, 67, 81 P.3d at 36 (Minzner, J., dissenting) (citing Pennsylvania v.
Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977)); see supra note 94 and accompanying text.
197. See Vandenberg,2003-NMSC-030, 69-73,81 P.3d at 36-37 (Chavez, J., dissenting). Justice Chavez
thought three additional factors warranted discussion: (1) Officer Roberts was not initially concerned for his safety
and he did not see any signs of weapons, (2) Officer Yost was standing near the passenger door during the stop and
she did not see any signs of weapons, and (3) Officer Roberts had already made up his mind to frisk Swanson and
Vandenberg when he returned with the warning citation. Id. 70, 81 P.3d at 37.
198. Id. 174, 81 P.3d at 37.
199. Id.; see supra notes 170-172 and accompanying text.
200. Vandenberg, 2003-NMSC-030, 74, 81 P.3d at 37-38 (Chavez, I., dissenting).
201. Id. 77, 81 P.3d at 38; see supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
202. Vandenberg, 2003-NMSC-030, 77, 81 P.3d at 38 (Chavez, J., dissenting).
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Justice Chavez distinguished CityofAlbuquerque v. Haywood °3 from the present
case by noting that, unlike in Haywood, an investigatory detention in this case was
not necessary to dispel the officer's initial subjective suspicion that the vehicle was
lacking a license plate.2 4 Here, "[e]ven a cursory investigation from the road would
have apparently shown to Deputy House... that the car not only had a license plate,
but that the registration was current."20 5
Justice Chavez was concerned that the majority's ruling "would invite pretextual
stops. ' 20 6 In conclusion, Justice Chavez stated that, because the first stop was
illegal, he would not have permitted the State to rely on anything in the BOLO
report to justify the reasonableness of Officer Roberts' frisk.20 7 Moreover, he noted
that the information contained in the BOLO had "a de minimis value in the armed
and dangerous calculus" because the report did not contain information suggesting
that Swanson or Vandenberg were armed and dangerous. 2 8 According to Justice
Chavez, the only reasonable explanation as to why Deputy House issued the BOLO
report was to punish the defendants for exercising their Fourth Amendment
rights-something the New Mexico Supreme Court should discourage.2 9
V. ANALYSIS AND IMPLICATIONS
The issues presented in Vandenberg were troublesome for New Mexico courts.
Among the eight judges and justices that were involved in the appellate process,
five separate opinions were written. 210 However, presumably due to an
understandable desire to protect the safety of police officers, the resolution of the
case unnecessarily stripped New Mexican motorists of their right to be left free
from arbitrary police conduct. Indeed, the outcome in Vandenbergfalls beneath the
protections afforded to citizens of the United States by the Fourth Amendment in
two respects. This is surprising and, even more, troubling considering New
Mexico's recent history of offering more protections to its citizens than the floor set
by the Fourth Amendment.2 ' Moreover, even though the New Mexico Supreme
Court had a golden opportunity to clarify whether article II, section 10 condones
pretextual police conduct, the court in Vandenberg deftly skirted the issue.

203. 1998-NMCA-029, 954 P.2d 93; see supra note 170.
204. Vandenberg, 2003-NMSC-030,
78-79, 81 P.3d at 38-39 (Chavez, J., dissenting).
205. Id.179,81 P.3d at 39.
206. Id.
207. Id.1 80, 81 P.3d at 39.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. See id.
1 1-56, 81 P.3d at 21-33 (majority opinion); id. IN 57-68, 81 P.3d at 33-36 (Minzner, J.,
dissenting); id. 9H 69-81, 81 P.3d at 36-39 (Chavez, J., dissenting); State v. Vandenberg, 2002-NMCA-066, B
1-29, 48 P.3d 92, 93-100; id. 30-37, 48 P.3d at 100-02 (Pickard, J., dissenting).
211. See supraPart I.B. Perhaps it is more accurate to recognize that article II, section 10 may not exactly
be offering "more" protections than the Fourth Amendment. Rather, as the U.S. Supreme Court makes more and
more exceptions to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement, New Mexico courts have simply used article II,
section 10 to hold the line.
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A. Fourth Amendment Issues
1. The First Stop Was Arbitrary
The New Mexico Supreme Court could have-indeed it should have-found the
first traffic stop by Deputy House unconstitutional and, using the "fruit of the
poisonous tree" doctrine,2" 2 suppressed the marijuana. Recall that the majority in
Vandenberg accepted the district court's conclusion that Deputy House testified
truthfully when he claimed that the reason he stopped the car was because he
thought it was missing a license plate. 213 This was so even though the district court
thought the situation "fishy" and "acknowledged that'Deputy House's testimony...
seem[ed] odd.' 21 4 In essence, the majority held that the stop was constitutional
because Deputy House subjectively believed that the vehicle was lacking a license
plate.
As Justice Chavez realized, this reasoning is problematic. 2 5 Both the U.S.
Supreme Court and courts in New Mexico have consistently held that whether
reasonable suspicion or probable cause exists depends upon an objective view of the
facts known to the officer.2 16 In the context of traffic stops, the Supreme Court in
Delaware v. Prouse217 stated, "reasonableness.. .requires, at a minimum, that the
facts upon which an intrusion is based [be] measure[d] against an objective
standard, whether this be probable cause or [reasonable suspicion]., 218 This is
necessary to ensure that the driver's "reasonable expectation
of privacy is not
'subject to the discretion of the official in the field.' 21 9
In this case, it is difficult to see how the objective facts uphold the
constitutionality of Deputy House's stop. It was undisputed that the Monte Carlo
had a valid and current license plate attached to the rear of the automobile where
the manufacturer provided for it.220 Moreover, as Justice Chavez pointed out, not
only did Officer Roberts have no problem seeing the license plate, "but...he was
able to determine that the registration was current from the color of the registration
sticker on the license plate while he was driving down the road.,22' Also, Justice

212. See supra notes 120-126 and accompanying text.
213. See Vandenberg, 2003-NMSC-030, 42, 81 P.3d at 30.
214. Id. 14, 81 P.3d at 24 (quoting the district court).
215. See id. U 75-79, 81 P.3d at 585-86 (Chavez, J., dissenting).
216. See, e.g., Terr v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968) ("[1lt is imperative that the facts be judged against an
objective standard....'If subjective good faith alone were the test, the protections of the Fourth Amendment would
evaporate."') (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89,97 (1964)) (footnote and citations omitted); State v. Cohen, 103
N.M. 558, 562, 711 P.2d 3, 7 (1985) ("The facts and inferences are to be judged by an objective standard, i.e.,
would the facts available to the officer warrant the officer as a person of reasonable caution to believe the action
taken was appropriate?").
217. 440 U.S. 648 (1979); see supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
218. Prouse,440 U.S. at 654 (internal quotation marks and footnotes omitted). Here an argument could be
made that, even though a stop based on a traffic violation requires probable cause, see supranote 91, Deputy House
only needed reasonable suspicion to stop the Monte Carlo because he thought the vehicle was unregistered. See
Prouse, 440 U.S. at 661 (holding that an officer may stop a vehicle when there is "reasonable suspicion that the
driver is unlicensed or his vehicle unregistered"). Regardless of whether the standard used is probable cause or
reasonable suspicion, the objective facts in this case show that Deputy House's stop was unreasonable.
219. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 655 (quoting Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523,532 (1967)).
220. See Vandenberg,2003-NMSC-030, 3, 81 P.3d at 22; Vandenberg, 2002-NMCA-066, 18,48 P.3d
at 97.
221. Vandenberg, 2003-NMSC-030, 76, 81 P.3d at 585 (Chavez, J., dissenting).
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Chavez correctly noted that the majority's chastising of Swanson and Vandenberg
for not putting on affirmative evidence to dispute Deputy House's testimony was
misplaced.222 The burden is on the State to prove reasonable suspicion or probable
cause223-not on the defendant to prove the lack thereof.
The majority's reliance onAlbuquerquev. Haywood 24 does nothing to dispel the
unconstitutionality of the stop. A police officer's action must be reasonable both "at
its inception" and "in scope., 225 The inception of the stop in Haywood was justified
because the facts, viewed objectively, supported the officer's subjective belief that
the car was lacking a license and temporary tags.226 Haywood went on to hold that
the officer did not exceed the scope of the intrusion by checking the documentation
of the driver, since that further intrusion was de minimis. 227 The critical, and distinguishing, factor here is that the court in Haywood realized that, before asking the
driver for documentation-that is, expanding the scope of a stop-the car must be
validly stopped.228
In short, the majority made the error of assuming that the stop in Haywood was
valid because that officer "believed that the car was being driven without a license
plate or temporary tag. 229 However, when the court in Haywood specifically noted
that, "[u]nder the circumstances.. .it was not arbitrary for [the o]fficer to make a
traffic stop, ' 230 it understood that what matters are the objective facts, not an
officer's subjective belief. Indeed, according to the U.S. Supreme Court,
"[s]ubjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment
analysis. ' 231 The critical "circumstance" that made the stop valid in Haywood was
the fact that "the windows were so darkly tinted that the temporary tag was not
visible until the vehicle was stopped. 232
In Vandenberg, however, Deputy House's stop was not valid because the
circumstances did not require him to stop the car. That is, the objective facts show
that Swanson's car had a license plate exactly where it was supposed to be, and that
the plate and current registration sticker were discemable from a moving vehicle.
Since the initial stop was illegal, the court should have used the "fruit of the
poisonous tree" doctrine23 3 to suppress the marijuana.234

222. Id. 77, 81 P.3d at 38.
223. See, e.g., United States v. Perdue, 8 F.3d 1455, 1462 (1Oth Cir. 1993) ("The government has the burden
of demonstrating 'that the seizure it seeks to justify on the basis of a reasonable suspicion was sufficiently limited
in scope and duration to satisfy the conditions of an investigative seizure."' (quoting Florida v. Royer 460 U.S. 491,
500 (1983))).
224. 1998-NMCA-029, 954 P.2d 93; see supranote 170.
225. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1968); see supra notes 74-79 and accompanying text.
226. See Haywood, 1998-NMCA-029, N 11-12,954 P.2d at 96-97.
227. Id. 13, 954 P.2d at 97.
228. See id. 12, 954 P.2d at 97 ("[W]henever a driver is validly stopped for whatever reason, it is
reasonable for the officer to ask for [documentation].") (citing State v. Reynolds, 119 N.M. 383, 388, 890 P.2d
1315, 1320 (1995)).
229. State v. Vandenberg, 2003-NMSC-030, 41, 81 P.3d 19, 29 (emphasis added).
230. Haywood, 1998-NMCA-029, 12, 954 P.2d at 97.
231. United States v. Whren, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996); see supra notes 107-114 and accompanying text.
232. Haywood, 1998-NMCA-029, 12, 954 P.2d at 97.
233. See supra notes120-126 and accompanying text.
234. Cf. State v. Lowe, 2004-NMCA-054, 17, 90 P.3d 539, 543 ("[C]onsent is often held to be the fruit
of a poisonous tree when the conduct that precedes it is illegal.").
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Both the majority and Justice Chavez believed that if Deputy House's stop was
unconstitutional, then Officer Roberts would be precluded from relying on the
information in the BOLO to inform the reasonableness of the frisk.2 35 Assuming the
first stop was illegal, however, neither Justice Chavez nor the majority explained
why they would have allowed Officer Roberts to rely on the information in the
BOLO to target Swanson's vehicle in the first place. Arguably, if the fruit of the
poisonous tree doctrine is to be taken seriously, the stop by Officer Roberts should
have been deemed an illegal "fruit" as well. 36 Although there are exceptions to the
2 38
poisonous tree doctrine,2 37 it is difficult to see how they would apply in this case.
Justice Chavez did recognize the essential distinction between Chapmanand the
instant case.239 Yet, Justice Chavez' dissent is problematic in two regards. First,
Justice Chavez feared that the majority's deference to the subjective belief of an
officer "would invite pretextual stops."24 As noted above, however, a pretextual
stop presumes an objectively valid stop to begin with.241 That is, a stop is not
pretextual unless the officer "could have" stopped the car. Justice Chavez agreed
that, given the objective facts, Deputy House could not have validly stopped the car.
Thus, Justice Chavez would have been correct had he stated that the majority's
ruling would invite arbitrary stops. Arguably, his misuse of terminology is
reflective of, and contributes to, the court's general confusion about the nature of
pretextual police conduct.242
Second, Justice Chavez missed the point when he claimed that "[t]he only logical
reason for the BOLO was retribution for Defendants' exercise of their.. .rights to
be free from unreasonable detention. 2 43 The more logical reason for the BOLO was
that Deputy House was simply suspicious that Swanson and Vandenberg possessed
drugs and wanted his investigation to .continue. 2 4 Indeed, one of the more
frustrating aspects of this case is the entire court's unwillingness to directly
confront the obvious possibility that both Deputy House and Officer Roberts were
motivated by a hunch that Swanson and Vandenberg were drug couriers. While
Justice Chavez should be applauded for challenging the constitutionality of the first
stop, it is difficult to believe that the reason Officers Roberts and Yost were looking

235. Vandenberg, 2003-NMSC-030, 39, 81 P.3d at 29; id. 1 80, 81 P.3d at 39 (Chavez, J., dissenting).
236. In Wong Sun v. UnitedStates, 371 U.S. 471 (1963), the Supreme Court cited approvingly the statement
in SilverthorneLumber Co. v. UnitedStates, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920), that "evidence [illegally] acquired shall
not be used...at all." Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 485. The Court went on to hold that the exclusionary rule does not
distinguish between verbal and physical evidence. Id.
237. See supra notes 125-126 and accompanying text.
238. As noted at infra note 297, it is difficult to argue that Officer Roberts came across the Monte Carlo
independently. Moreover, given the temporal proximity of the two stops and the lack of any intervening factors,
it is hard to see how the "taint" of the illegal first stop had "dissipated." Finally, Officer Roberts would not have
"inevitably discovered" the marijuana without the BOLO report put out by Deputy House.
239. Vandenberg, 2003-NMSC-030, 78, 81 P.3d at 38-39 (Chavez, J., dissenting).
240. id.
241. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
242. See infra notes 292-298 and accompanying text.
243. Vandenberg, 2003-NMSC-030, 80, 81 P.3d at 39 (Chavez, J., dissenting).
244. Interestingly, while recounting the facts, the majority did recognize this. See id. N 5-6, 81 P.3d at 22
(majority opinion) ("Deputy House['s]... suspicions were aroused....Because Deputy House thought Defendants
had acted in a suspicious manner, he issued a.. .BOLO....").
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for a reason to pull over the Monte Carlo 245 was to somehow punish Swanson and
Vandenberg for exercising their right to refuse a consensual search.
Although the majority only devoted three paragraphs to discussing Deputy
House's initial stop, 246 the implication of its discussion is dire for motorists in New
Mexico. Moreover, in her dissent, Justice Minzner did not discuss the legality of the
first stop; hence, it is safe to presume that she agreed with the majority's analysis.
This means that four out of the fivejustices on the New Mexico Supreme Court will
be likely to uphold future police conduct similar to that of Deputy House. In other
words, officers in New Mexico now have the freedom to pull over any motorist on
a whim to check documents or to pursue a hunch that the occupants might be
involved in criminal activity. All that is required is for police officers to say that
they mistakenly believed that the vehicle did not have a license plate. Even if the
objective facts show such a statement to be implausible, or, in other words, "fishy,"
current law in New Mexico after Vandenberg places the burden on the motorist to
affirmatively show the officer's error.
In sum, the result is that police officers, already given extremely broad leeway
under Whren,247 are now free to make purely arbitrary stops in New Mexico. The
U.S. Supreme Court deemed this arbitrariness unconstitutional over twenty-five
years ago in Prouse.2 4' Given that the Supreme Court has not changed its mind since
then,249 the holding in Vandenberg falls beneath the minimal protections afforded
by the Fourth Amendment.
2. The Frisk Was Unreasonable
The majority believed this case was simply about "trac[ing] the outer boundary
of facts and circumstances sufficient tojustify a protective frisk., 250 The court, however, overshot the constitutional mark when it attempted to delineate this outer
boundary.
The majority concluded that Officer Roberts' fear was objectively reasonable in
light of his direct observations,2 5 coupled with the "relevant" information in the
253 and screened through the lens of his experience as a law enforcereport,"'
BOLOofficer.
ment
Then, perhaps realizing that the enumerated factors added up to

245. See id. 72, 81 P.3d at 37 (Chavez, J., dissenting) (noting that Officer Yost "admitted that she was
looking for a reason to stop" the car); see also id. 6, 81 P.3d at 22 (majority opinion) (stating that Officer Roberts
responded to Deputy House's BOLO report).
246. See id. 1 40-42, 81 P.3d at 29-30.
247. See supra Part MI.A. i.e.
248. See supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
249. See, e.g., City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 39 (2000) ("The officer's conduct in [Prouse]
was unconstitutional primarily on account ofhis exercise of 'standardless and unconstrained discretion."' (quoting
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661 (1979))).
250. Vandenberg, 2003-NMSC-030, 1, 81 P.3d at 21.
251. See id. 1 27, 81 P.3d at 26; supra note 34 and accompanying text.
45-47, 81 P.3d at 30-32; supra notes 177-182 and
252. See Vandenberg, 2003-NMSC-030,
accompanying text.
29-30,81 P.3d at 27. The majority also discussed the behavior
253. See Vandenberg,2003-NMSC-030,
Swanson exhibited after Officer Roberts ordered him to submit to a frisk. See id. 30, 81 P.3d at 27. After
acknowledging that Justice Minzner was troubled by how the majority relied on facts following initiation of the
frisk to justify the frisk itself, see id. T 64-65, 81 P.3d at 35-36 (Minzner, J., dissenting), the majority simply
agreed and responded that it was "rely[ing]...on those preludial facts to justify Officer Roberts' frisk." Id. 30 n.2,
81 P.3d at 27 n.2 (majority opinion).
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simple nervousness, the majority stated that "nervousness alone [is not] sufficient
to justify a frisk for weapons. '254 Rather, according to the court, what matters is that
Officer25Roberts
was able to articulate why that nervousness made him fear for his
5
safety.
It is difficult not to be left with the impression that the majority simply did not
want to suppress the evidence. The fact the majority found that Officer Roberts met
"the exacting burden of presenting exigent circumstances, in sufficient detail and
' does little to dispel this notion. After close analysis,
with convincing sincerity"256
the methodology the majority used breaks down and reveals that the boundaries of
the protective frisk doctrine were stretched past their breaking point in Vandenberg.
a. Relevant or Irrelevant?
Besides labeling the relatively minor and easily explained nervous tics that
Swanson and Vandenberg displayed2 57 as an exhibition of"extreme nervousness, 258
the court's splitting of the information in the BOLO report into relevant and
irrelevant components is deeply troubling. Although the cases the majority used for
support may be read to find that the behavior of a person in refusing to consent to
a search is "relevant" to the reasonable suspicion equation, none of them dealt with
the issue of officer safety.259 Rather, all of the cited cases hold that such behavior
is, or might be, relevant in the context of a drug investigation.
The need to distinguish between the two contexts becomes especially apparent
considering Professor Melilli's article that the majority used for support. 260 There,
Professor Melilli argues that a person's behavior in refusing to consent is relevant
on evidentiary grounds;2 61 that is, because it is probative of criminal conduct.262
Professor Melilli simply does not say that such behavior is indicative of
dangerousness. Hence, by not differentiating between the two contexts, the majority
was able to suddenly deem the act of refusing as "irrelevant." In doing so, the court
managed to avoid addressing the likely possibility that the frisk conducted by
Officer Roberts was in fact motivated by a desire to search for evidence.
Recall the syllogism that the court relied upon.2 63 First, the court labeled it "selfevident that Defendants' refusal is not a probative fact of guilt, suspicion, or

254. Id. 131, 81 P.3d at 27.
255. Id.
256. Id. 132, 81 P.3d at 28.
257. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
258. Vandenberg, 2003-NMSC-030, 28, 81 P.3d at 26.
259. See cases cited supra note 178.
260. See Melilli, supranote 102. The majority used Professor Melilli's article to support its proposition that
a refusal to consent itself is irrelevant, see Vandenberg, 2003-NMSC-030, 46, 81 P.3d at 32, not for its
proposition that behavior in refusing to consent is relevant to the formulation of dangerousness. See id. 45, 81
P.3d at 30-3 1.
261. See Melilli, supra note 102, at 926-28.
262. See id.at 927 ("[T]he behavior of the defendants was especially probative of criminal conduct in a way
that a less "peculiar" refusal to consent to a search is not."); see also id. at 928 ("[The overreaction [when]
refusing to consent to search is.. especially relevant to a conclusion that the motive for refusal is to avoid detection
of evidence of a crime."). For a critique of Melilli, see Chanenson, supra note 98, at 427-32 (explaining why the
"reliance on the 'ordinary rules of evidence' in the context of reasonable suspicion and probable cause is
misplaced").
263. See supra notes 180-182 and accompanying text.
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dangerousness. ' '26 On its face, this is not problematic. Relying on this statement,
however, the court went on to find that the "refusal should not be considered in
determining whether Officer Roberts had reasonable.., suspicion that Defendants
were armed and dangerous, 265 and, "[t]herefore,.... we do not consider Defendants'
refusal to consent as a relevant fact.",2 " The syllogism breaks down on the middle
prong. That is, rather than simply saying the refusal to consent "should not be
considered," the majority would have been more correct had it said, "Officer
Roberts should not have considered the refusal to consent." By relying on its
formulation, however, the court was subtly and deftly able to consider the refusal
to consent "irrelevant" to its own analysis. At the same time, the court managed to
avoid the sticky question of whether Officer Roberts did in fact consider the refusal
itself "relevant."
The problem here is twofold. First, the court did not consider the totality of
circumstances as required in United States v. Arvizu.26 7 Instead, by splitting the
information in the BOLO report into two components and only considering one of
them, the court employed a "divide-and-conquer" type analysis. 26" A totality of
circumstances analysis would have included (1) the "irrelevant" fact that Swanson
and Vandenberg had refused consent to run a drug-sniffing dog around the car, (2)
they had just been stopped in a tag-team fashion, 269 and (3) the fact that Deputy
House also told Officer Roberts that one reason he was suspicious was because
Swanson and Vandenberg had given an "inconsistent" story.270 These facts, known
to Officer Roberts but disregarded by the court, better inform Swanson's and
Vandenberg's simple nervousness. 271 That is, given the level of nervousness
displayed, in light of all the circumstances, it is only reasonable to conclude that the
two were acting nervously because they sensed they were being targeted, rather than
because they were armed and dangerous. 2
Second, the court was wrong to rely on cases holding that the behavior of a
person in refusing to consent might inform an officer's reasonable suspicion to

264. Vandenberg, 2003-NMSC-030, 46, 81 P.3d at 31.
265. Id.
266. Id. 147, 81 P.3d at 32.
267. 534 U.S. 266 (2002); see id. at 273 (holding that in making reasonable suspicion determinations
reviewing courts "must look at the 'totality of the circumstances' of each case"); see also supra note 84.
268. See Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274. But see Vandenberg, 2002-NMCA-066, In 30-33, 48 P.3d at 100-01
(Pickard, J., dissenting) (arguing that an Arvizu analysis would uphold the frisk on officer safety grounds).
269. The majority labeled this second stop as "ordinary" and "routine." Vandenberg, 2003-NMSC-030, W
1, 32, 81 P.3d at 21, 27. Arguably, it was anything but. Cf State v. Zelinske, 108 N.M. 784, 788, 779 P.2d 971,
975 (Ct. App. 1989) (stating that a hunch "cannot be transformed into probable cause 'by reason of ambiguous
conduct which the arresting officers themselves have provoked' (quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S.
471,484 (1963))), overruledon other grounds by State v. Bedolla Ill N.M. 448, 806 P.2d 588 (Ct. App. 1991);
United States v. Campbell, 261 F.3d 628, 633 (6th Cir. 2001) ("It is well established that police officers are not
free to create exigent circumstances to justify their warrantless searches.").
270. See Vandenberg, 2003-NMSC-030, R 5-6, 81 P.3d at 22; see also supra notes 15-26 and
accompanying text.
271. It should be reiterated that this "nervousness" consisted of "watching Officer Roberts in the rearview
mirror, drumming fingers on the roof of the car, speaking to each other, rolling the windows of the car up and
down, glancing back at Officer Roberts, and general fidgeting." Vandenberg, 2002-NMCA-066, 9125, 48 P.3d at
99.
272. See Damato v. State, 64 P.3d 700, 709 (Wyo. 2003) (stating that nervousness displayed by a motorist
in refusing to consent to a search is of no significance because the officer did not treat the traffic stop as routine).
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support a criminal investigation27 3 since the frisk supposedly had nothing to do with
investigating a crime.274 Simply put, there is no precedent holding that an officer's
formulation of reasonable suspicion that a person is armed and dangerous can be
informed by that person's demeanor in refusing to consent to search. Unfortunately,
in this sense, Vanderberg does break new ground.
Only one case, State v. Robb,275 has considered the question, and it came to the
opposite conclusion. That court held that "a citizen's nervousness about having his
or her property searched and voicing the desire not to have [it] searched [does not]
'
suppor[t] an inference that he or she is dangerous and can access a weapon." 276
Although that court gave "value and respect [to] a police officer's intuition," it
found that those instincts, "even if proven correct, are insufficient to justify a
'
Robb is the better rule, as it is simply more honest and
protective search."277
analytically correct.
If the court in Vandenberg simply did not want to suppress the evidence, it
should have done something else. It would have been better had it directly and
openly sided with those jurisdictions holding that an officer can expand the scope
of an investigation. based on the reaction of a suspect in refusing to consent to a
search.278 That is, rather than deeming the refusal itself "irrelevant," the court could
have held that Officer Roberts' actions were justified because the demeanor of
Swanson and Vandenberg was indicative of criminal conduct-not because it
supported a reasonable suspicion that they were armed and dangerous.279
Ultimately, whether or not Officer Roberts had ulterior motives when initiating
the frisk, 2 0 and whether or not the New Mexico Supreme Court recognized this, is
beside the point. The point is that, after Vandenberg, the court has opened the door
for such misconduct. Government officials are now free to mask unsubstantiated
searches for evidence behind the fagade of "officer safety." New Mexico courts
should not allow, let alone create, the possibility of such dishonest behavior. At
least if the court had upheld the frisk on the argument that the nervousness was
indicative of criminal conduct, it would have put its own credibility on the line
rather than passing it on to officers in the field.
b. Articulating Fear
The majority's analysis also stretches the constitutional limits of Terry past the
breaking point by relying on Officer Roberts' ability to articulate why simple
nervousness caused him to fear for his safety. The court adopted the following
273. See supra note 178.
274. See Vandenberg, 2003-NMSC-030, 33, 81 P.3d at 28 ("[S]afety, and safety alone, justified.. the
protective pat down....More was at stake here than mere evidence.").
275. 605 N.W.2d 96 (Minn. 2000).
276. Jd. at 103.
277. Id.
278. Cf David A. Harris, FriskingEvery Suspect: The Withering ofTerry, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1,6 (1994)
("If.. we now think that only automatic frisks following every Terry stop can make officers safe, we should be
willing not only to say so directly, but also to confront the full range of consequences of that conclusion.").
279. It should be pointed out that, if Officer Roberts had not found either weapons or drugs during his frisk,

he would have been able to "frisk" the passenger compartment of the Monte Carlo under Michigan v. Long, 463
U.S. 1032 (1983). See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
280. See Harris, supra note 278, at 35-36 (discussing the widespread practice of"testilying" by police).
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statement as a rule of law from Judge Pickard's dissent in the court of appeals: "[I]t
is not the degree of nervousness that allows the officer to pat a defendant down, but
instead it is the articulation by the officer of specific reasons why the nervousness
the officer to reasonably believe that his or her
displayed by the defendant caused
2 1
safety would be compromised.,
The problem here is that the court suggests that a police officer need only
formulate some semi-plausible reason as to why a person's nervousness triggered
a fear of safety. This is problematic because the emphasis is on the officer's
subjective state of mind, rather than on a de novo determination of whether that fear

was objectively reasonable. 28 2 U.S. Supreme Court Fourth Amendment jurispru-

dence has consistently held that the facts must be reasonable and articulable. That
is, it is not that an officer is able to articulate why he feared for his safety; rather,
the requirement is that an officer articulatefacts that, in turn, objectively add up to
reasonable suspicion. 83
Moreover, the court disingenuously termed the nervous behavior of Swanson and
Vandenberg as "extreme. "284 When it comes down to it, it is difficult to understand
how tapping fingers on the roof of a car, glances over shoulders, conversation, and
rolling a window up and down a few times on a hot, humid, and rainy afternoon285
constitutes "extreme" nervousness.2 86 As a result, police officers in New Mexico
may now well be allowed to frisk a tremendously large swath of the public.287 To
make sure a frisk is upheld, all an officer now has to do is to give some reason as
to why nervous behavior created a belief that a person might be armed and
dangerous.288 Not only does this subjective standard fall far below Terry as
originally understood, but it also falls below the law in numerous other
jurisdictions.28 9 On the other hand, Vandenbergputs New Mexico in line with other
courts that have already watered down Terry and its U.S. Supreme Court progeny:

281. Vandenberg, 2003-NMSC-030, 31, 81 P.3d at 27 (quoting Vandenberg, 2002-NMCA-066, 34,48
P.3d at 101 (Pickard, J., dissenting) (quotation marks omitted)); see also Vandenberg, 2003-NMSC-030,1 29,81
P.3d at 27 (finding that Officer Roberts believed Swanson's and Vandenberg's nervous tics "indicated that they
may have been in 'fight or flight' mode, a concept he learned at the law enforcement academy").
282. Indeed, this subjective "articulation" test directly contravenes the edicts ofthe U.S. Supreme Court. See
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968) ('If subjective good faith alone were the test, the protections of the Fourth
Amendment would evaporate, and the people would be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, only in
the discretion of the police."' (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964) (internal quotation marks omitted))).
283. See, e.g., Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049 (1983); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S.
873,884 (1975). Acorrect reading ofState v. Chapman, 1999-NMCA-106, 986 P.2d 1122, supports U.S. Supreme
Court precedent. See supra note 158.
284. Vandenberg, 2003-NMSC-030, 28, 81 P.3d at 26.
285. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
286. This holds true even if one adds the "relevant" information of general nervousness that Swanson and
Vandenberg displayed at the first stop.
287. See United States v. Millan-Diaz, 975 F.2d 720, 722 (10th Cir. 1992) ("It is common knowledge that
most citizens.. .whether innocent or guilty, when confronted by a law enforcement officer who asks them potentially
incriminating questions are likely to exhibit some signs of nervousness.").
288. Cf Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767-68 (1995) (stating that a race-neutral justification for the
exercising of peremptory challenges "does not demand an explanation that is persuasive, or even plausible").
289. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 735 So. 2d 570, 572 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that acting nervous
and perspiring without threatening or furtive gestures does not justify a frisk); Moore v. Commonwealth, 404
S.E.2d 77, 78 (Va. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that a frisk based on subjective belief of dangerousness due to shaking
hands and stuttering and stammering of words is objectively unreasonable).
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Although the motive seems laudable-protection of the police-the extent to
which these cases give police leeway threatens to shrink the Supreme Court's
high-sounding words into nothing but meaningless small print. The result is that
in many jurisdictions police may legally frisk suspects automatically-without
any consideration of whether the individual might be armed and often in spite of
a total lack of any such indications-in an array of cases so wide that it might
astonish the Justices.l2
B. Article 1,Section 10
Even though Vandenberg afforded the New Mexico Supreme Court two
opportunities to analyze the issue of pretext under article II, section 10, the court
sidestepped the issue by framing it as "an abstract question" lacking factual
foundation. 29' First, the court could have analyzed whether the stop by Officer
Roberts was constitutional under article II, section 10. Second, the court could have
analyzed whether the subsequent pat down of Swanson was pretextual, and, if so,
whether such action passes state constitutional muster. That the court did not is
unfortunate, if only because it would have clarified this area of law in New Mexico.
1. The Stop for Speeding
At the suppression hearing, the district court stated, "I'm not convinced Officer
Roberts lied about speeding as the basis for his stop and if speeding occurred, then
that is reasonable suspicion and the officer provided evidence supporting reasonable
suspicion for his stop. '29 2 Because of this, the majority in Vandenberg determined
that, "even assuming [it] were to adopt [the] Defendants' argument about the
reason
consequences of officer pretext under the state constitution," there
293 was no
to analyze the issue because it was lacking "factual foundation.,
Strangely, even though the issue had been fully briefed,294 the court misunderstood the issue. Under Whren v. UnitedStates,295 police act pretextually when they
"use valid bases of action against citizens... for pursuing other investigatory
agendas. 296 Under this standard, the stop by Officer Roberts was a classical
pretextual stop. Officer Roberts used a valid basis of action against Swanson-a
stop for speeding-to pursue a hunch that the Monte Carlo contained drugs. 297 Since
reasonable suspicion that the vehicle was carrying drugs was lacking, Officer

290. Harris, supra note 278, at 22.
53, 81 P.3d at 33; see also supra Part IV.A.3. Using the
291. See Vandenberg, 2003-NMSC-030,
interstitial approach to the analysis of state constitutional issues, the court of appeals was not able to reach the
pretext issue since it held the evidence suppressible under the Fourth Amendment. See Vandenberg, 2002-NMCA066, 1 25 n.3, 48 P.3d at 99 n.3.
292. Vandenberg, 2003-NMSC-030, 53, 81 P.3d at 33.
293. Id.
294. See Defendant-Respondent's Answer Brief at 31-35, State v. Vandenberg, 2003-NMSC-030, 81 P.3d
19 (No. 27,509).
295. 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
296. Id. at 811. For a discussion ofpretextual police conduct, see supra Part III.A. .e.
297. After receiving the BOLO, including the information that Swanson and Vandenberg had acted nervously
when declining the dog sniff, Officer Roberts specifically targeted the Monte Carlo out of a group of speeding cars.
See supranotes 28-29 and accompanying text. Given this, there is simply no other explanation for Officer Roberts'
conduct. Officer Roberts did not come across the Monte Carlo by happenstance.
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Roberts used an otherwise legal reason to make the stop. In essence, because of the
speeding, Officer Roberts could stop the Monte Carlo; however, absent his underlying motive, Officer Roberts simply would not have stopped the car. According to
the court, however, because it was undisputed that Swanson was speeding, the stop
was simply not pretextual.2 98 Seemingly, the New Mexico Supreme Court avoided
the issue by misunderstanding the definition of a pretextual stop.
The issue that the court in Vandenberg avoided is whether New Mexico should
allow a police officer to use any violation of the traffic code to conduct a stop when,
given the underlying motivation of the officer, the stop would otherwise be illegal.
By explicitly adopting Whren, most other states allow such conduct.2 99 In State v.
Ladson, ° however, the Washington Supreme Court held that pretextual traffic
stops, like those explicitly authorized in Whren, are illegal under its state
constitution. 30 1 After reviewing its case law, the court in Ladson found "that the
police may not abuse their authority to conduct a warrantless search or seizure
under a narrow exception to the warrant requirement when the reason for the search
or seizure does not fall within the scope of the reason for the exception."3 2 The
of form over substance; a triumph of
court found that "[p]retext is... a triumph
30 3
expediency at the expense of reason. 1
Ladson'sreasoning is persuasive and New Mexico should hold pretextual traffic
stops illegal as well. Previously, New Mexico courts have refused to follow the U.S.
Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence when they believed that doing
so would unnecessarily strip New Mexicans of their right to be left free of intrusive
police conduct.30" Since Whren allows an officer to make an end run around
Brignoni-Ponce'srequirement that an officer must have reasonable suspicion that
criminal activity is underway before pulling over an automobile, New Mexico
courts should use article II, section 10 as a protection against arbitrary police
conduct.30 5 Unfortunately, by misconstruing the definition of pretext, the court in
Vandenberg neglected to analyze this important issue. Fortunately, on the other
hand, a viable argument for rejecting Whren remains.
2. A Pretextual Frisk?
Even if the New Mexico Supreme Court explicitly adopted Whren and allowed
pretextual traffic stops in New Mexico, it could still have decided that a pretextual

298. See Vandenberg, 2003-NMSC-030, 53, 81 P.3d at 33.
299. For a list of states that have either explicitly or implicitly adopted rhren, see People v. Robinson, 767
N.E.2d 638, 649-50 (N.Y. 2001).
300. 979 P.2d 833 (Wash. 1999) (en banc).
301. Id. at 842 (concluding that Washington citizens "hold a constitutionally protected interest against
warrantless traffic stops or seizures on a mere pretext to dispense with the warrant when the true reason for the
seizure is not exempt from the warrant requirement").
302. Id.
303. Id. at 838.
304. See, e.g., State v. Cardenas-Alvarez, 2001-NMSC-017, 25 P.3d 225; State v. Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006,
932 P.2d 1; State v. Arredondo, 1997-NMCA-081, It128-29, 944 P.2d 276, 284-85, overruled on other grounds
by State v. Steinzig, 1999-NMCA-081, 944 P.2d 276.
305. See supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text; see also Ladson, 979 P.2d at 842 n.l0 (noting that if
the court "were to depart from [its] holdings and allow pretextual traffic stops, Washington citizens would lose their
privacy every time they enter their automobiles").
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frisk violates the Fourth Amendment. A pretextual frisk would occur when,
although articulable facts support an objectively reasonable belief that a suspect is
armed and dangerous,306 an officer's motive for conducting the frisk is to search for
evidence. Hence, in this situation, after finding that Officer Roberts had a
sufficiently legal justification for frisking Swanson and Vandenberg, the court
would have asked what his real motivations were. Given the totality of the
circumstances, it is not difficult to come to the conclusion that the underlying
motivation was to search for evidence of criminal conduct.
Although the issue ofpretextual frisks has not received much attention," 7 at least
one state court has determined that "the pretext factor is relevant" when considering
whether a frisk is reasonable.3"' In State v. Varnado, 09 a police officer discovered
crack cocaine on a minor traffic violator after he frisked her-ostensibly because
he wanted her to sit in his squad car.3 1 The Minnesota Supreme Court noted that
the district court had "concluded that [the officer's] purported frisk for weapons
was pretextual and designed to conduct a warrantless search for narcotics." '3 1.
Because "the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment [could be
contravened] simply by requesting that a person sit in [a] squad car," the court in
Varnado distinguished Whren." 2 It did so by noting that Whren only applies "'in
ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis. "313 Thus, since the frisk had
nothing to do with probable cause, the court was free to look at the subjective
motivation of the officer. 14
As noted above, although it is certain that Whren does not apply when there is
no probable cause, it is uncertain if Whren applies when there is reasonable
suspicion.3" 5 Arguably, because a frisk is a greater intrusion on a person's autonomy
than is the stop of an automobile,3 16 and because the reasonable suspicion standard
gives an officer greater discretion than probable cause,317 the "pretext factor" should
be relevant in analyzing frisks. Granted, the frisk in question in Varnado was not
even based on reasonable suspicion.3" 8 Nonetheless, because a frisk is a serious

306. As noted above, see supra note 290, this is already an extremely low threshold to meet.
307. When invalidating frisks based on the underlying motivations of an officer, courts have generally simply
found that the frisk was not objectively reasonable. See, e.g., Jones v. DEA, 819 F. Supp. 698,717-18 (M.D. Tenn.
1993) (finding frisk subjectively done to search for evidence when the objective facts showed the frisk
unreasonable). As just noted, a "pretextual frisk" should be understood as being objectively reasonable were it not
for the officers' unconstitutional motivation to search for evidence.
308. State v. Varado, 582 N.W.2d 886, 892 (Minn. 1998).
309. 582 N.W.2d 886 (Minn. 1998).
310. Id. at 888-89.
311. Id. at 892.
312. Id. at 891-92.
313. Id. at 892 (quoting Whren, 517 U.S. at 813). The court in Varnado decided this case under the Fourth
Amendment-not Minnesota's constitution. See id.at 893 (holding that the frisk "was invalid under the Fourth
Amendment").
314. See id.
315. See supra note 114.
316. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17 (1968) (stating that a frisk "isa serious intrusion upon the sanctity
of the person, which may inflict great indignity and arouse strong resentment").
317. See id. at 38 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (discussing reasonable suspicion as it relates to probable cause
and arguing that "[t]o give the police greater power than a magistrate is to take a long step down the totalitarian
path").
318. The court in Varnado was concerned that a police officer could evade the requirement of reasonable
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intrusion on a person's integrity, and because an officer does not need probable
cause to conduct one, New Mexico courts should, at the very least, consider the
question of whether the "pretext factor" is relevant to frisks. Unfortunately, by
misconstruing the nature of pretext, and by affording too much deference to the
magical words "officer safety," the court in Vandenberg avoided this important
question.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although the New Mexico Supreme Court struggled to hold a tight rein on
Vandenberg, after close analysis, it is clear that the court was unable to keep its
holding from seeping past the constitutional boundaries of the Fourth Amendment
to the U.S. Constitution. The result is that New Mexico citizens may now be
subjected to entirely arbitrary traffic stops and frisks. Moreover, although the court
intimated that it would allow officers very broad discretion under the New Mexico
Constitution, the court failed to clarify whether article II, section 10 prohibits
pretextual police conduct. By not directly addressing this issue, the court has given
a green light to questionable police conduct and, at the same time, deflected
responsibility for allowing this to happen.

suspicion by frisking motorists before having them sit in a squad car without any particular showing of
dangerousness. See Varnado, 582 N.W.2d at 891-92.

